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INTRODUCTION
Following the assassination of leading Russian opposition
politician Boris Efimovich Nemtsov on February 27, 2015,
international media and others speculated on the Russian
government’s degree of involvement, if any, in the murder.1 A year
later, Mr. Nemtsov’s allies assert that the culprit will likely never be
found due to a Kremlin-orchestrated cover-up. 2 Leaving aside the
question of who, if anyone, ordered the killing, this Note asserts that
Russian State acts or omissions regarding Mr. Nemtsov’s reputation
in Russian society were a proximate cause of his assassination, and
1. See, e.g., Owen Matthews, Who Really Killed Boris Nemtsov?, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 23,
2015, 9:22 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/who-really-killed-boris-nemtsov-315705
(outlining disputes over Kremlin involvement in the murder); Catherine A. Fitzpatrick,
Reichstag Redux: The Boris Nemtsov Murder Conspiracy Theories, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 1,
2015, 3:23 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/01/who-killed-boris-nemtsova-rundown-of-the-conspiracy-theories.html (describing the main theories of Mr. Nemtsov's
murder, including four mutually exclusive theories put forth by federal investigators); J. Paul
Goode, The Question to Ask About Boris Nemtsov’s Murder is not Who but Why?, WASH.
POST (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/03/
the-question-to-ask-about-boris-nemtsovs-murder-is-not-who-but-why/ (noting that “For
Nemtsov’s supporters and admirers, the Kremlin’s brand of hateful, anti-opposition and ‘fifth
column’ propaganda serves as explanation” for Mr. Nemtsov's killing).
2. Id.; Shaun Walker, Boris Nemtsov murder investigators name Chechen mastermind,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/29/boris-nemtsovinvestigators-name-chechen-mastermind (noting opposition leader Ilya Yashin's allegation that
“investigators are carrying out a political order to cover up the real culprits”); Sarah Rainsford,
Boris Nemtsov killing: Grief, fear and anger one year on, BBC NEWS (Feb. 27, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35675221 (quoting Nemtsov family counsel Vadim
Prokhorov as fearing a “cover-up”).
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that since these acts or omissions were violative of Russian and
international law, his family has the right to seek damages in a
defamation action at one of the international human rights tribunals
whose jurisdiction Russia recognizes. The Note concludes that both
the United Nations Human Rights Committee (“Committee”), the
tribunal attached to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”); and the European Court of Human Rights
(“European Court”), the tribunal attached to the European Convention
on Human Rights (“ECHR”), are proper venues given not only the
explicit protections to reputation contained in the former treaty and
implicit protections in the latter, but also the sheer obviousness of Mr.
Nemtsov’s case.
This Note pursues the case of Boris Nemtsov to explore the
concept of character assassination as a counterpart to guaranteed
protections to honor and reputation in Russian and international law.
In response to liberal objections based on freedom of expression
concerns, this Note takes the position of the Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation (“Supreme Court”) as it pertains to defamation in
the press, which is that speech is a proper subject of administrative
regulation.3
Mr. Nemtsov was edged out of the most influential Russian
political circles as his criticism of the government of Vladimir
Vladimirovich Putin grew stronger in the years leading up to his
murder.4 This was largely a result of the fact that media that were or
3. Пленум Верховного Суда Российской Федерации, Постановление от 24 февраля
2005 г. N 3, О судебной практике по делам о защите чести и достоинства граждан, а
также деловой репутации граждан и юридических лиц (Plenum of the Supreme Court of
the Russian Federation of Feb. 24, 2005 No. 3, On Juridical Practice in Cases of the
Protection of Honor and Dignity of Citizens, as well as Business Reputation of Citizens and
Legal Entities) [hereinafter Plenary Directive], ¶ 4 (“The protection of honor, dignity, and
business reputation from untrue, defamatory statements constitutes a necessary restriction of
the freedoms of expression and of the media in cases of abuse of these rights.”). This and all
subsequent translations from Russian to English are by the author.
4. Andrew E. Kramer, Fear Envelops Russia After Killing of Putin Critic Boris Nemtsov,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/world/europe/killing-ofboris-nemtsov-putin-critic-breeds-fear-in-russia.html (describing Mr. Nemtsov's status as
dissident years after serving as a deputy prime minister); Isabella Kolar, “Wer stirbt zuerst:
Putin oder Russland?”: Interview mit Boris Nemzow (“Who Dies First: Putin or Russia?”:
Interview with Boris Nemtsov), DEUTSCHLANDRADIO KULTUR (Jan. 18, 2014),
http://www.deutschlandradiokultur.de/interview-mit-boris-nemzow-von-2014-wer-stirbtzuerst-putin.979.de.html (interview with German radio in which Mr. Nemtsov quips of fears
that he will be killed).
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are fully or substantially owned by the Russian government engaged
in a concerted effort to destroy Mr. Nemtsov’s credibility and
reputation in the final two years of his life, painting him as an
“enemy” of Russia aligned with insidious non-Russian interests in a
bid to destabilize the country. 5 This Note explores the right to
reputation provisions of the ICCPR as the source of a strong case at
the Committee, which oversees compliance with that treaty but also
acts as a tribunal on claims of State violations of Covenant provisions,
with a cause of action based on this media campaign.6 The Note also
sees the protections to reputation built into the ECHR’s privacy
provision — though not as clear as the protections in the ICCPR — as
a strong basis for a successful claim at the European Court, which
oversees compliance with that treaty. 7 But given both tribunals’
5. Ivan Nechepurenko, Analysts Blame Nemtsov's Death on Russia's ‘Legitimized Hate’,
MOSCOW TIMES (Feb 28, 2015), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=516716
(quoting political scientist Alexei Makarkin stating that Mr. Nemtsov's killing demonstrates
how “hatred has been legitimized or even sanctioned in Russia”); Liubov Borusyak and
Aleksei Levinson, Анатомия ненависти: как возникло посткрымское единство россиян
(Anatomy of Hate: What Happened to Russian Unity Post-Crimea), RBK (Mar. 18, 2015, 4:14
PM), http://www.rbc.ru/opinions/society/18/03/2015/550973de9a7947327e5f3a1c (describing
the “fifth column” theory); Maria Lipman, Putin’s Enemy Within: Demonising the “Fifth
Column”, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.ecfr.eu/article/
commentary_putins_enemy_within_demonising_the_fifth_column311513 (further describing
the “fifth column” theory of Russian opposition politics).
6. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Dec. 19, 1966) [hereinafter First Optional Protocol], art. 1 (“A State Party to
the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the
Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction
who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the
Covenant.”).
7. Compare Annex to G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] art. 17 (“1. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks.”) with Council of Europe, European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos.
11 and 14 (Nov. 4, 1950), E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European Convention or ECHR] art. 8 (“1.
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.”); ECHR, art. 19 (“To ensure the observance of the
engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols
thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as ‘the
Court’. It shall function on a permanent basis.”).
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domestic exhaustion requirements, explained below, Mr. Nemtsov’s
representatives would first have to sue in the Russian court system.8
In that connection, this Note explains the Russian federal statutes
treating defamation, including a relevant provision of the Russian
Constitution.9
Notably, Russia recognizes the jurisdiction of multiple
international human rights tribunals, while its Constitution protects
reputation and honor analogously to the ICCPR provision on right to
reputation — and even more firmly than the ECHR.10 Also, Russia
constitutionally guarantees the freedoms of expression, association,
and privacy, among others. 11 Many provisions of the Human and
Civil Rights and Freedoms section of the Russian Constitution are
nearly identical to the equivalent provisions of the ECHR and the
ICCPR.12
A successful regional and national politician in the final
moments of the Soviet government and in the subsequent Russian
government of President Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin, Mr. Nemtsov was
central to the introduction of capitalism to the Russian economy
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union..13 Mr. Nemtsov later
became a prominent and acerbic critic of the Russian government
under President Putin (and of Mr. Putin personally), asserting that the
Russian government was taking a turn for the authoritarian.14 He also
8. Infra Part II(3)(b-c).
9. Infra Part II.
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
11. КОНСТИТУЦИЯ РOССИЙСКОЙ ФEДЕРАЦИИ [КОНСТ. РФ] [CONSTITUTION] (Russ.)
[hereinafter KRF] art. 29 (“1. Everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of ideas and
speech.”); art. 30 (“1. Everyone shall have the right to association, including the right to create
trade unions for the protection of his. The freedom of the activities of public associations shall
be guaranteed.”); art. 23 (“1. Everyone has the right to the inviolability of private life, personal
and family secrets, and the protection of his honor and good name. 2. Everyone has the right to
privacy of his correspondence, telephone conversations, mail, telegraph, and other messages.
Limitations to this right are permitted only by court order.”).
12. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
13. Yelena Dikun, Profile of Boris Nemtsov: Russia's Newest First Deputy Premier,
JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION (Apr. 18, 1997, 3:00 AM), http://www.jamestown.org/single/
?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=19613&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=219#.Vo6
Pxyospsc (providing the general contours of Mr. Nemtsov's political career from the late 1980s
through mid 1990s); Jonathan Steele, Boris Nemtsov Obituary, GUARDIAN (March 1, 2015,
1:31 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/01/boris-nemtsov (calling Mr.
Nemtsov a “leading pro-market reformer in the first, tumultuous post-Soviet decade”).
14 . Steele, supra note 13 (noting Mr. Nemtsov's opposition to Kremlin policy);
Prominent Russians: Boris Nemtsov, RUSSIAPEDIA, http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-
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claimed a culture of unbridled malversation in Russia, which was
further illustrated in his multiple publications beginning in 2008. 15
Given the Putin government’s perceived tolerance of political
killings, in early 2015 Mr. Nemtsov went on the record with fears that
Mr. Putin would arrange his murder.16
The same month, Mr. Nemtsov was shot several times on
Moscow’s Bolshoi Moskvoretsky Bridge, just steps from the Kremlin
walls – one of the most heavily surveilled areas in all of Russia.17
Bullets struck his head, heart, liver, and stomach. 18 He died at the
scene only hours after calling on the public to march in protest of
Russia’s ongoing military engagement in Ukraine. 19 About a week
later, two men from Russia’s volatile North Caucasus region were

russians/politics-and-society/boris-nemtsov/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) (noting Mr. Nemtsov's
participation in mass anti-Putin demonstrations).
15. See generally VLADIMIR MILOV & BORIS NEMTSOV, PUTIN. RESULTS. 10 YEARS:
THE INDEPENDENT EXPERT REPORT (2010) (alleging widespread corruption touching the
upper echelons of Russian society); NATIONAL FREEDOM PARTY, PUTIN. CORRUPTION. THE
INDEPENDENT EXPERT REPORT (2011) (alleging same).
16. Борис Немцов: Боюсь того, что Путин меня убьет (Boris Nemtsov: I Fear that
Putin Will Kill Me), SOBESEDNIK (Feb. 10, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/
20150301202856/http://sobesednik.ru/politika/20150210-boris-nemcov-boyus-togo-chtoputin-menya-ubet (describing Mr. Nemtsov's comments regarding the possibility of his
assassination); Russia opposition politician Boris Nemtsov shot dead, BBC NEWS (Feb. 28,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31669061 (noting Mr. Nemtsov's stated fears
that the Kremlin would arrange his killing).
17. Прохоров: Немцов погиб как мужчина (Prokhorov: Nemtsov Died Like a Man),
RIA NOVOSTI (Feb. 28, 2015), http://ria.ru/society/20150228/1050174998.html (describing
Mr. Nemtsov's murder); Убийство Бориса Немцова: вся хроника субботы (The Murder of
Boris Nemtsov: A Full Chronology of Saturday), MOSKOVSKIJ KOMSOMOLETS (Feb. 28,
2015),
http://www.mk.ru/politics/2015/02/28/ubiystvo-borisa-nemcova-vsya-poslednyayainformaciya-onlayntranslyaciya.html (providing a timeline of the moments following Mr.
Nemtsov's murder); Борис Немцов погиб от пули, попавшей в сердце (Boris Nemtsov Killed
by a Bullet to the Heart), L!FE NEWS (Feb. 28, 2015), http://lifenews.ru/news/150510
(reporting Mr. Nemtsov's assassination). See also ул. Большой Москворецский мост
(Bolshoi Moskvoretsky Bridge Street), GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/
maps/place/ul.+Bolshoy+Moskvoretskiy+most,+Moskva,+Russia/@55.7494048,37.620296,17
z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x46b54af8bcce78ad:0xb4a432d1fc127aa2 (showing the Bolshoi
Moskvoretsky Bridge and its placement roughly 75 feet from the Kremlin walls).
18. See id.
19 . See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Boris Nemtsov (@BorisNemtsov),
TWITTER (Feb. 27, 2015, 9:36 PM), https://twitter.com/BorisNemtsov/status/
571378284933619713 (providing the route of the planned anti-war march).
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arrested and charged with Mr. Nemtsov’s murder. 20 Documented
irregularities in those arrests have been a subject of international
discussion and inquiry, including at the Committee.21
As Mr. Nemtsov increased his criticism of Russia’s 2014
annexation of Crimea and troop incursion in Ukraine, Russian media
began a major campaign to discredit him. 22 A key feature of this
campaign was the clear placement of Mr. Nemtsov in a cabal of
supposed “national traitors” who were allegedly beholden to insidious
non-Russian interests and bent on destabilizing the country. 23 Mr.
Nemtsov was regularly described in major media as a leader of the
“fifth column,” a sinister group of Western-backed interloperagitators in Russian society. 24 This media campaign has also been
noted in discussions at the Committee.25 On one occasion, then-Prime
Minister Putin publicly accused Mr. Nemtsov of being a political
opportunist who had stolen massive amounts of money from state
coffers in the 1990s, and who was seeking once again to “line his
pockets.”26

20. Walker, supra note 2 (describing the arrests connected to Mr. Nemtsov's killing);
Rainsford, supra note 2 (noting the arrests of Chechen men in purported connection to Mr.
Nemtsov's murder).
21. U.N. Hum. Rights Council, Communications Report of Special Procedures Sent, 1
March to 31 May 2015; Replies received, 1 May to 31 July 2015, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/27
(Sept. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Special Procedures Report] at 11 (“The Government has opened an
investigation into his death; however Government officials have made public judgments in
relation to the killing that may prejudice the investigation.”).
22. Nechepurenko, supra note 5 (describing media efforts to discredit Mr. Nemtsov);
Special Procedures Report, supra note 21, at 11 (noting that Mr. Nemtsov “had been accused
by State media and public officials of being an ‘enemy of Russia.’”)
23. В Рунете запустили сайт со списком «предателей Родины» (On RuNet, List of
“National Traitors” Launches), LENTA.RU (Mar. 7, 2014), http://lenta.ru/news/2014/03/07/
predatel/ (noting Mr. Nemtsov's rhetorical placement among alleged “traitors” of Russia);
Борис Немцов – предатель: независимое расследование (Boris Nemtsov, the Traitor:
Independent Investigation), NEWSLAND (Dec. 30, 2011), http://newsland.com/news/detail/
id/854794/ (dubious report purporting to show Mr. Nemtsov's “betrayal” of Russia); Борис
Немцов – предатель России (Boris Nemtsov: Traitor to Russia), POLITIKUS.RU (Jan. 9,
2012), http://politikus.ru/video/105-boris-nemcov-predatel-rossii.html (pseudo-documentary
purporting to prove Mr. Nemtsov's alignment with anti-Russian forces).
24. See id.; Lipman, supra note 5.
25. Special Procedures Report, supra note 21, at 11 (“Mr. Nemtsov was previously
arrested in connection with his role in peaceful protests and had been accused by State media
and public officials of being an ‘enemy of Russia.’”).
26. Путин призвал не допустить во власть тех, кто “поураганил” в 90-е годы
(Putin Urges to Keep from Power Those Who “Churned” In the 1990s), RIA NOVOSTI (Dec.
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The media atmosphere in Russia has been characterized as one
of “legitimized hate” following the campaign to discredit Mr.
Nemtsov and others like him.27 In Russia, television media – which is
nearly universally owned by Kremlin-friendly entities – is the primary
source of information. 28 There is nothing to substantiate any claim
that the Kremlin called on national media to discontinue or even
soften the allegations of Mr. Nemtsov’s collusion with non-Russian
powers in a bid to subvert the stability of the country. For these
reasons, Mr. Nemtsov’s family has recourse under the right to
reputation provisions of the Russian Constitution, the Russian
Criminal and Civil Codes, the ICCPR, and the privacy provision of
the ECHR.29
Part I of this Note gives a brief history of Mr. Nemtsov’s place
in Russian politics and society generally in order to demonstrate his
stature. It begins with his late Soviet political activism in Nizhny
Novgorod, then called Gorky, an industrial hub 400 kilometers (250
miles) east of Moscow. It then discusses his ascendancy through elite
Russian politics during the post-Soviet Russian government of Mr.
Yeltsin, which corresponds roughly to the 1990s. Finally, it explains
Mr. Nemtsov’s marginalization following well-documented
publications purporting to expose corruption and other features of the
Putinist system of governance.
Part II discusses protections to reputation and honor, including
liability for defamation generally. This begins by briefly addressing
legal academic understandings of defamation, and is followed by

16, 2010), http://ria.ru/politics/20101216/309511640.html (quoting Prime Minster Putin's
comments regarding Mr. Nemtsov's political motivations in the 1990s and the present day).
27. Nechepurenko, supra note 5 (describing the media-fueled atmosphere of “legitimized
hate” in modern Russia).
28. Кому принадлежат основные СМИ в России (Who Owns Major Media in Russia),
RIA NOVOSTI (Jan. 27, 2012), http://ria.ru/infografika/20120127/550041009.html (infographic
showing Russian television, print, and radio media as majority owned (in terms of number of
outlets) by government agencies, State-owned entities, and instrumentalities of the City of
Moscow); Кто владеет СМИ в России: ведущие холдинги (Who Owns the Media in Russia:
Leading Holdings), BBC RUSSIAN BUREAU (July 11, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/russian/
russia/2014/07/140711_russia_media_holdings (describing Russian government holdings in
media, as well as the holdings of state-held entities); see also Svetlana Pasti, Mikhail
Chernysh, & Luiza Svitich, Russian Journalists and Their Profession, in THE GLOBAL
JOURNALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY 267, 268 (David H. Weaver and Lars Willnat eds., 2012)
(noting the holdings of the Kremlin and State-owned entities in Russian media).
29. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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Russian and international statutory law. It refers to relevant provisions
of the Russian Constitution and Criminal and Civil Codes, as well as
to analogous provisions in the ICCPR and ECHR. It also includes an
examination of the domestic Russian and international recourse
available to Russian nationals who face attacks on their reputation,
with Mr. Nemtsov in mind.
Part III considers the practical application of the laws discussed
in Part II. For example, this Part discusses some procedural
restrictions to the international human rights tribunals. Also included
is a brief discussion of the legal status of Committee Views, the
Committee’s rulings on ICCPR violation complaints. Further, this
Part outlines right to reputation jurisprudence at the Supreme Court,
the Committee, and the European Court in order to illustrate how
those courts treat the concept.
Given Russia’s domestic and international statutory obligations
to protect its nationals from attacks on their honor and reputation, this
Note argues in Part IV that Mr. Nemtsov's family should begin the
litigation process within the Russian court system against individual
media outlets for their defamatory claimsSuch a suit could be filed
based on Russian constitutional, criminal, and civil law, but with a
view to continuation if necessary at one of the two international
human rights tribunals whose jurisdiction Russia recognizes.
Acknowledging the sheer strength of Mr. Nemtsov’s case, the
fundamental question for his representatives is one of recourse should
the case reach an international tribunal. In the case that his
representatives favor money damages for the Russian media’s slander
campaign against Mr. Nemtsov in the final years of his life, the
European Court of Human Rights would be the preferable forum.30
But, in the case that they prefer public refutations of the allegations
that constituted this campaign in the very media that broadcast the
claims in the first place, the United Nations Human Rights Committee
is the preferable forum. 31 All of this assumes, of course, that the
Russian court system does not provide the quite strong recourse
available under various sections of the Russian Civil Code and
Criminal Code, discussed in Part II(2).32
30. See infra Part II(3).
31. See infra Part II(2).
32. See infra Part II(2).
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To be clear, this Note does not assert that there are any clear
grounds to sue the Russian government in direct relation to Mr.
Nemtsov’s murder. It also takes no position on the rightness or
wrongness of Mr. Nemtsov’s activities or political stances as a leader
of Russia’s government or, later, its opposition movement. Rather, it
is the project of this Note to demonstrate how the Russian
government is liable in tort for acts and, more importantly, omissions
facilitating a political atmosphere that observers agree was a
proximate cause of Mr. Nemtsov’s murder regardless of who pulled
the trigger.
Given the protections to reputation in Russian law, the ICCPR,
and the ECHR, the Russian government would ultimately be liable as
a result of the defamation cause of action outlined here even if Mr.
Nemtsov were still alive today. 33 In that connection, the intended
readership of this Note is first and foremost Mr. Nemtsov’s
representatives including legal counsel, and the international tribunal
of their choice should they choose to litigate a defamation claim at
that tribunal. To a lesser extent, this Note touches on questions of
Russian defamation law in both the civil and criminal contexts in a
manner that could be of interest for students of international, foreign,
and comparative public law.
I: A SHORT BIOGRAPHY OF BORIS E. NEMTSOV
Born in Sochi in 1959 and raised in Gorky (today, Nizhny
Novgorod), Boris Nemtsov graduates the Physics Department of
Gorky State University (today’s Lobachevsky State University of
Nizhny Novgorod) in 1981.34 In 1985, at 25 years old, he defends a
Ph.D. in Physics and Mathematics at the same institute. 35 In the
following years he publishes prolifically on thermodynamics and

33. Infra Parts II-III.
34. Nemtsov Boris (Efimovich), ACADEMIC.RU (2006), http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/
fin_enc/25740/Немцов [hereinafter ACADEMIC.RU] (providing a timeline of Mr. Nemtsov's
life from 1959-2006); Биография Бориса Немцова (Biography of Boris Nemtsov), RIA
NOVOSTI (Feb, 28, 2015), http://ria.ru/spravka/20150228/1050127398.html [hereinafter
Biography of Boris Nemtsov] (describing Mr. Nemtsov's academic life).
35. Biography of Boris Nemtsov, supra note 34 (describing Mr. Nemtsov's academic life);
Биография Бориса Немцова (Biography of Boris Nemtsov), TASS (Feb, 28, 2015),
http://tass.ru/info/1798210 [hereinafter Biography of Boris Nemtsov (TASS)] (noting Mr.
Nemtsov's doctoral work at Gorky State).
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acoustics questions as a fellow at the Radiophysical Research
Institute, also in Gorky-cum-Nizhny Novgorod.36
He enters electoral politics in 1989 in a losing bid for People’s
Deputy of the Soviet Union.37 In 1990, Mr. Nemtsov runs as a Gorky
representative to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic.38 The
only non-Communist candidate, he is elected as a member of the
Democratic Russia bloc. 39 President Yeltsin appoints Mr. Nemtsov
governor of the Nizhny Novgorod Region the same year; he is elected
to a second term in the post in 1995 with nearly sixty percent of the
vote.40
Governor Nemtsov oversees a regional reform program through
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the early post-Soviet period.41
Chaotic free-market policies rule, and when there is not enough
currency available, Mr. Nemtsov issues his own to be exchanged later
for Russian rubles. 42 The Nizhny Novgorod region experiences a
unique level of economic growth during this period, drawing
significant foreign direct investment.43
In 1993, Mr. Nemtsov is elected to the Federation Council — the
upper house of the Federal Assembly, Russia’s parliament — with
36 . List of Publications by Boris E. Nemtsov, HARVARD UNIVERSITY SAO/NASA
ASTROPHYSICS DATA SYSTEM, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/nph-abs_connect?return_
req=no_params&author=Nemtsov,%20B.%20E.&db_key=PHY (showing 42 articles and
abstracts of Mr. Nemtsov's academic work on topics including, for example, “Linear
interaction of waves in a magnetoplasma in the presence of periodic inhomogeneities”).
37. Biography of Boris Nemtsov (TASS), supra note 35 (describing Mr. Nemtsov's early
political activities); Dikun, supra note 13 (describing same).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40 . Dikun, supra note 13 (noting Mr. Nemtsov's popular election following
appointment); Biography of Boris Nemtsov (TASS), supra note 35 (noting Mr. Nemtsov's
1995 election).
41 . Biography of Boris Nemtsov (TASS), supra note 35 (describing the Nizhny
Novgorod region reforms under Mr. Nemtsov's direction); Yuri Artemev, Три Жизни
“Немцовок” (The Three Lives of the “Nemtsovki”), BONISTIKA, http://www.bonistikaweb.ru/
nemcovka.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) (discussing reforms in Nizhny Novgorod during Mr.
Nemtsov's stewardship).
42. Artemev, supra note 41 (discussing the “Nemtsovki,” the regional currency issued
under Mr. Nemtsov's direction); Serge Schmemann, The Brilliant Boris Nemtsov: A Reformer
Who Never Backed Down, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
03/03/opinion/the-brilliant-boris-nemtsov-a-reformer-who-never-backed-down.html
(noting
the regional currency issued during the period).
43. Dikun, supra note 13 (noting unique economic growth in Nizhny Novgorod during
Mr. Nemtsov's term); Schmemann, supra note 42 (noting same).
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support from Russia’s Choice and Yabloko, at that time the country’s
chief liberal political parties. 44 Through the mid-1990s, political
observers speculate that President Yeltsin will name Mr. Nemtsov as
his successor, with Western press calling him a “top young
reformer.”45 In March 1995, Mr. Nemtsov is awarded the Medal of
Service to the Fatherland, Russia's highest civilian decoration.46
In 1997, Mr. Nemtsov is named First Deputy Prime Minister of
the Russian Federation.47 Some press report that in a meeting with
United States President Bill Clinton, President Yeltsin refers to Mr.
Nemtsov as his chosen successor.48 Summer 1997 opinion polls show
that half of Russians would support Mr. Nemtsov in the 2000
presidential election.49
Mr. Nemtsov and other free-market reformers fall out of public
favor, though, when the Russian stock market crashes in 1998 and
Russia defaults on its sovereign debt. 50 The subsequent economic
crisis expands into a major general political crisis. 51 In December
1998 Mr. Yeltsin dissolves the government, and Mr. Nemtsov is
44. ACADEMIC.RU, supra note 34 (describing Mr. Nemtsov's election to the Federation
Council); Biography of Boris Nemtsov (TASS), supra note 35 (noting Mr. Nemtsov's support
from mainstream liberal parties).
45. Geoffrey York, Yeltsin Recruits Top Young Reformer Nemtsov, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Mar. 1997), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/from-the-archives-yeltsin-recruitstop-young-reformer-nemtsov/article23235987/ (referring to Mr. Nemtsov as a “top young
reformer”); Steele, supra note 13 (stating that Mr. Nemtsov had been “earmarked by President
Boris Yeltsin as his successor”).
46. ПРЕЗИДЕНТ РОССИИ, УКАЗ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РФ N 260 “О НАГРАЖДЕНИИ МЕДАЛЬЮ
ОРДЕНА “ЗА ЗАСЛУГИ ПЕРЕД ОТЕЧЕСТВОМ” II СТЕПЕНИ” (ОТ 10 МАРТА 1995 Г.) (PRESIDENT
OF RUSSIA, DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RF NO. 260, AWARDING THE MEDAL “FOR
SERVICE TO THE FATHERLAND,” II DEGREE (MAR. 10, 1995)), http://kremlin.ru/
acts/bank/7627.
47. ACADEMIC.RU, supra note 34 (noting Mr. Nemtsov's appointment to the post); York,
supra note 45 (noting Mr. Nemtsov's position as First Deputy Prime Minister).
48. Gregory L. White, Boris Nemtsov’s Career Traces Arc of Russia’s Dimmed Hopes
for Democracy, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/boris-nemtsovscareer-traces-arc-of-russias-dimmed-hopes-for-democracy-1425168024 (noting claims that
President Yeltsin had named Mr. Nemtsov as his successor to foreign heads of state); Steele,
supra note 13 (stating that Mr. Nemtsov had been “earmarked by President Boris Yeltsin as his
successor”).
49 . Kolar, supra note 4 (noting Summer 1997 popular support for Mr. Nemtsov);
Nemtsov, Boris, LENTA.RU ARCHIVE, http://lenta.ru/lib/14160327/full/ (last visited Jan. 11,
2016) (describing Mr. Nemtsov's apparent trajectory towards the Presidency of Russia).
50. Steele, supra note 13 (describing the political implications of the Russian default);
Biography of Boris Nemtsov (TASS), supra note 35 (describing same).
51. Id.
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forced to resign as Deputy Prime Minister.52 A year later, President
Yeltsin unexpectedly resigns in a televised address on December 31,
1999. 53 In his speech, a kind of apology for the chaos that
characterized Russia’s transition from Soviet rule, Mr. Yeltsin tells
the Russian people, simply, “I seek your forgiveness, that many of our
dreams did not come true.”54 He notifies them in the address that in
accordance with the Constitution, the presidency is to be handed
provisionally to Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin.55
In January 2000, Mr. Nemtsov co-authors an op-ed about interim
President Putin in The New York Times entitled Russia’s Best Bet.56
“Russia could do considerably worse than have a leader with an
unwavering commitment to the national interest,” Mr. Nemtsov and
Eurasia Group head Ian Bremmer write. 57 Following this period,
though, Mr. Nemtsov becomes increasingly critical of President
Putin’s policies.58 In January 2004, he co-authors an article warning
the Russian masses of an incipient Putinist dictatorship.59
In November 2007, Mr. Nemtsov is one of several dozen
protesters arrested while chanting “Russia without Putin!” near St.
Petersburg’s Winter Palace. 60 The protest is a week ahead of
52. Id.
53. Обращение Президента Б.Н. Ельцына к гражданам России 31 декабря 1999
года (Address of President B.N. Yeltsin to the Citizens of Russia, December 31, 1999),
DELOVAYA PRESSA (Jan. 10, 2000), http://www.businesspress.ru/newspaper/article_mId_
33_aId_4812.html (full text of President Yeltsin's resignation speech); Ilya Karpyuk, Речь
Ельцына 31.12.1999 (Speech of Yeltsin 31.12.1999), YOUTUBE (Apr. 25, 2007),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yvSpiFvPUP4 (full video of President Yeltsin's
resignation speech).
54. Id.; Текст новогоднего обращения Бориса Ельцина (Text of New Year's Address
by Boris Yeltsin), BBC RUSSIAN BUREAU (Dec. 31, 1999), http://www.bbc.com/
russian/address.htm (including Mr. Yeltsin's apology for dreams forsaken).
55. Id.
56. Boris Nemtsov and Ian Bremmer, Russia's Best Bet, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/05/opinion/russia-s-best-bet.html (“Russia could do
considerably worse than have a leader with an unwavering commitment to the national
interest.”).
57. Id.
58. White, supra note 48 (outlining Mr. Nemtsov's relations with the Russian leadership
over time); Vladimir Kara-Murza and Boris Nemtsov, Об угрозе путинизма (On the Threat
of Putinism), NEZAVISIMAJA GAZETA (Jan. 22, 2004), http://www.ng.ru/politics/2004-0122/3_letter.html (asserting the danger of a return to authoritarianism under President Putin).
59. Kara-Murza and Nemtsov, supra note 58 (open letter “to those who cannot put a
price on freedom and democracy”).
60. Police Arrest Scores at Opposition Rally in Russia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/world/europe/25iht-russia.4.8470583.html (noting Mr.
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parliamentary elections. 61 More than a dozen parliamentary
candidates are seen in attendance at the rally. 62 “So many police
proves they are afraid of us,” Mr. Nemtsov tells the press following
his release.63
On May 7, 2008, Dmitry Anatolevich Medvedev replaces
Vladimir Putin as President of Russia.64 Mr. Medvedev's first move as
executive is to appoint Mr. Putin prime minister. 65 While the
Medvedev presidency is seen as more liberal than that of Mr. Putin,
the latter is understood as the more powerful of the two, and the term
“tandemocracy” becomes a fashionable characterization of the
Russian style of governance during the period. 66 Political and
sociological histories of Russia generally assert that Mr. Putin
maintains effective control of the country during the Medvedev
presidency.67
In March 2009, Mr. Nemtsov announces that he will run for
mayor of Sochi, his birth city, in elections the following month.68 He
Nemtsov's participation in mass rallies); Boris Nemtsov (b_nemtsov), LIVEJOURNAL (Nov. 24,
2007), http://b-nemtsov.livejournal.com/12082.html?thread=1063218 (describing his arrest).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Police Arrest Scores at Opposition Rally in Russia, supra note 60.
64 . Medvedev becomes Russia's leader, BBC NEWS (May 7, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7386940.stm (reporting on Mr. Medvedev's election to the
Russian Presidency); Michael Stott and Oleg Shchedrov, Russia's Medvedev takes power and
pledges freedom, REUTERS (May 7, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russiainauguration-idUSL0649335020080507 (reporting same).
65. Id.
66. Ilan Berman, Inscrutable Russian ‘Tandemocracy’, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2010),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/15/inscrutable-russian-tandemocracy/
(describing the general features of the “tandemocracy”); see also ANNA ARUTUNYAN, THE
PUTIN MYSTIQUE: INSIDE RUSSIA’S POWER CULT (2014), at Introduction (explaining that
under the “tandemocracy,” Russia was “de jure” ruled by Dmitry Medvedev but “de facto”
ruled by “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin”); see generally Henry E. Hale and Timothy J.
Colton, Russians and the Putin-Medvedev “Tandemocracy”: A Survey-Based Portrait of the
2007-08 Election Season, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR EURASIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN
RESEARCH (Sept. 8, 2009) (employing the “tandemocracy” model as the status quo descriptor
of late-2000s Russian politics).
67. Id.
68 . Немцов зарегистрирован кандидатом в мэры Сочи (Nemtsov Registers as
Mayoral Candidate in Sochi), LENTA.RU (Mar. 28, 2009), http://lenta.ru/news/2009/
03/28/nemtsov/ (reporting Mr. Nemtsov's entry to the Sochi mayoral race); Adrian Blomfield,
Alexander Lebedev joins race to be Russian mayor, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 18, 2009),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/5011403/Alexander-Lebedevjoins-race-to-be-Russian-mayor.html (noting Mr. Nemtsov's candidacy for Mayor of Sochi).
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is attacked with ammonium chloride outside his office by proKremlin activists shortly thereafter, and asserts to the press his belief
that the attack is in retaliation to his criticism of plans to hold the
Winter 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi. 69 Mr. Nemtsov loses the
mayoral election.70
In March 2010, a group of prominent members of the Russian
intelligentsia publish an open letter calling for Prime Minister Putin’s
removal from the Russian government. 71 They urge the Russian
people “from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok” to demonstrate against Mr.
Putin.72 Mr. Nemtsov is a signatory.73
In June 2010, Mr. Nemtsov and Vladimir Stanislavovich Milov,
who had served as Deputy Minister of Energy during President
Putin’s first term, publish one million copies of a report entitled
Putin: Results. 10 Years. 74 The fourth report in the Putin: Results.
series begun in 2008, it advertises the Putin Must Go campaign on its
inside back cover.75 Police seize hundreds of thousands of copies of
the report, alleging “extremist” content.76 The day after publication,
the report’s website falls victim to cyber attack.77 Some of the report’s
69. Joshua Keating, Interview: Boris Nemtsov, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 1, 2010),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/01/interview-boris-nemtsov/ (noting the chemical attack on
Mr. Nemtsov); Simon Shuster, Why Russia’s Probe Into the Nemtsov Murder Does Not Stack
Up, TIME (Mar. 10, 2015), http://time.com/3738734/nemtsov-murder-investigation/ (noting the
2009 attack on Mr. Nemtsov).
70. Борис Немцов оспорит результаты выборов мэра Сочи в суде (Boris Nemtsov
Disputes Sochi Mayoral Election Results in Court), LENTA.RU (Apr. 27, 2009),
http://lenta.ru/news/2009/04/27/sud/ (describing Mr. Nemtsov's loss in the Sochi mayoral
election); На выборах мэра Сочи лидирует кандидат от “Единой России” (United Russia
Candidate Leads in Sochi Mayoral Elections), LENTA.RU (Apr. 27, 2009), http://lenta.ru/news/
2009/04/26/results/ (reporting on the election of the ruling United Russia Party candidate as
Mayor of Sochi).
71. Путин должен уйти! (Putin Must Go!), EZHEDNEVNYIJ ZHURNAL (Mar. 11, 2010),
http://www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=9935# (the open letter announcing the initiation of the Putin
Must Go! movement).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Milov & Nemtsov, supra note 15.
75. Id.
76 . Police seize 100,000 anti-Vladimir Putin books, TELEGRAPH (June 16, 2010),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7833181/Police-seize-100000-antiVladimir-Putin-books.html (describing police seizure of Mr. Nemtsov's reports).
77. Сайты Немцова и Милова подверглись атаке после публикации нового доклада
(Sites of Nemtsov and Milov Under Attack Following Publication of New Report), GRANI.RU
(June 15, 2010), http://grani.ru/Internet/m.178982.html (noting cyberattacks on the websites of
Mr. Nemtsov and Mr. Milov).

1304 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1289
chapters include “Corruption is Eroding Russia,” “A Dying Country,”
“A Country of Screaming Inequality,” “Pension Collapse,” “The
Multibillion-Dollar Scam” (regarding the Sochi Winter Olympic
Games), and others of similar tone.78
In December 2010, during a live televised address, Prime
Minister Putin accuses a group including Mr. Nemtsov of stealing
“many billions” from public coffers during the 1990s. 79 Mr. Putin
asserts that the political activism of Mr. Nemtsov and others who
oppose the sitting Russian government is simply a bid to return to
power in order to “line their pockets.”80 On New Year’s Eve 2010,
Mr. Nemtsov is arrested at an anti-government rally in Moscow.81 He
is sentenced to fifteen days in prison, spending Russia’s most
important civil holiday behind bars. 82 Following his release, Mr.
Nemtsov’s January 2011 defamation action against Prime Minister
Putin is dismissed: the ruling holds that names like “Boris Nemtsov”
simply refer metonymically to “a certain class of political actor” and
that, therefore, the televised allegations are not actionable.83
In March 2011, Messrs. Nemtsov and Milov release the report
Putin: Corruption, the fifth in the Putin: Results. series.84 The report
documents the riches of the Russian political class, including 26
palaces and five yachts used by President Medvedev and Prime
Minister Putin. 85 Chapters include “Putin and His Billionaire

78. Id.
79. Putin Urges, supra note 26 (alleging without context that Mr. Nemtsov stole from the
Russian people during his tenure as an appointed and elected official).
80. Id.
81. Michael Schwirtz, Arrests in Russia Signal Divisions Over Dissent, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/04/world/europe/04russia.html (reporting Mr.
Nemtsov's arrest at a mass rally); Opposition leaders detained during Moscow New Year’s Eve
rally, RADIO FRANCE INT’L (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.english.rfi.fr/europe/20101231opposition-leaders-detained-during-moscow-new-year-s-eve-rally (reporting Mr. Nemtsov's
New Year's Eve arrest).
82 . Schwirtz, supra note 81 (noting the sentence levied against Mr. Nemtsov);
Opposition leaders detained, supra note 81 (reporting same).
83 . Борис Немцов стал именем нарицательным (Boris Nemtsov Becomes a
Household Name), KOMMERSANT (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1590640
(reporting Judge Adamova's ruling regarding Mr. Putin's allegations against Mr. Nemtsov).
84. PUTIN. CORRUPTION, supra note 15.
85. Id.
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Friends,” “Watches,” “Apartments and Cars,” and others in the same
vein.86
In 2011 and 2012, Mr. Nemtsov becomes increasingly active in
street protests.87 He also begins making appearances to United States
and European Union legislatures, urging rule of law measures
regarding Russia including sanctions and travel bans on individual
members of the Putin government.88 As his political criticisms grow
louder through 2013, Mr. Nemtsov is threatened with various criminal
charges.89
On March 18, 2014, Russia annexes Crimea, an historically
significant peninsula on the Black Sea, from Ukraine, which is in the
midst of a civil war. 90 Mr. Nemtsov is one of the most prominent

86 . НЕЗАВИСИМЫЙ ЕКСПЕРТНЫЙ ДОКЛАД: ПУТИН. КОРРУПЦИЯ (INDEPENDENT
EXPERT REPORT: PUTIN. CORRUPTION) 2 (V. Milov, B. Nemtsov, V. Ryzhova, & O. Shornoj
eds., 2012).
87 . Чем запомнился Борис Немцов? (For What is Boris Nemtsov Remembered?),
ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.aif.ru/dontknows/file/chem_zapomnilsya_
boris_nemcov (noting Mr. Nemtsov's participation in street politics); Boris Nemtsov,
Резолюция 15 сентября (Resolution of September 15), EKHO MOSKVY (Sept. 13, 2012),
http://echo.msk.ru/blog/nemtsov_boris/929726-Ekho/ (blog post discussing participation in
mass anti-Putin rallies).
88. Вслед за “списком Магнитского” в Европе появятся списки Ходорковского и
Немцова (Following the “Magnitsky List” in Europe, Come the Khodorkovsky and Nemtsov
Lists), PRAVO.RU (Feb. 17, 2011), http://pravo.ru/news/view/48584/ (reporting Mr. Nemtsov's
visit to European Parliament in promotion of sanctions against members of the Russian
political class); Каспаров с Немцовым передали американским конгрессменам дополнения
в “список Магницкого”: туда включили Чурова, Бастрыкина и ряд судей (Kasparov and
Nemtsov Give American Congressmen Additions to the “Magnitsky List,” Including Churov,
Bastyrkin, and Various Judges), ALTAPRESS.RU (July 6, 2012), http://altapress.ru/story/89165
(reporting Mr. Nemtsov's lobbying of United States politicians to sanction sitting Russian
politicians).
89. Борис Немцов вновь стал фигурантом уголовного дела (Boris Nemtsov Once
Again Figures in Criminal Case), RBK (Aug. 25, 2012), http://www.rbc.ru/politics/
25/08/2012/666323.shtml (describing battery charges against Mr. Nemtsov); Против Бориса
Немцова могут возбудить дело по «экстремистской» статье (Against Boris Nemtsov,
Possible Initiation of Charges under the “Extremism” Article), GAZETA.RU (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2013/09/16/n_3187537.shtml (reporting incitement charges
against Mr. Nemtsov and his political party).
90. Steven Lee Meyers & Ellen Barry, Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and Bitterly
Denounces the West, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/
world/europe/ukraine.html (reporting Russia's reincorporation of Crimea); Matt Smith & Alla
Eshchenko, Ukraine cries ‘robbery’ as Russia annexes Crimea, CNN (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/18/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/ (reporting same).
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voices of outrage in Russia regarding the annexation.91 In February
2015, Mr. Nemtsov tells Russian daily Sobesednik of his fear that
“Putin will kill me.”92
Leading up to this time, unsubstantiated claims against Mr.
Nemtsov amplify in Russian media, in particular allegations that he is
a traitor to Russia; the Committee takes note.93 On February 27, 2015,
Mr. Nemtsov tweets to tens of thousands of followers the proposed
route of an “anti-crisis, anti-war” march in Moscow.94 Hours later he
is shot six times, more or less on the Kremlin doorstep, dying at the
scene.95
II: RIGHT TO REPUTATION IN THE RUSSIAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
This Part offers background on the Russian and international
statutory and case law that frame later discussions of liability for
media attacks on Mr. Nemtsov’s honor and reputation. To provide
context, it begins with general questions regarding defamation as a
tort and as an historical legal concept. It continues by specifically
discussing the right to reputation provision of the Russian
Constitution and the sections on defamation in the Russian Criminal
and Civil Codes. Finally, this Part looks at the right to reputation as a
concept in the ECHR and the ICCPR. That last section of the Part also
reviews the origins and procedures of the ICCPR’s individual
complaint mechanism.

91 . Резолюция Марша Мира 21 сентября (Resolution of the Peace March of
September 21), EKHO MOSKVY (Sept. 21, 2014), http://echo.msk.ru/blog/Ekhomsk/1400978Ekho/ (placing Mr. Nemtsov’s among the loudest anti-annexation voices in Russian society).
92. Milov & Nemtsov, supra note 15.
93. Special Procedures Report, supra note 21, at 11 (“Mr. Nemtsov was previously
arrested in connection with his role in peaceful protests and had been accused by State media
and public officials of being an ‘enemy of Russia.’”).
94. Nemtsov, supra note 19 (Twitter post giving the route of the planned march).
95 . Steele, supra note 13 (reporting the known forensic details of Mr. Nemtsov's
murder); The Murder of Boris Nemtsov, supra note 15 (reporting same); Bolshoi Moskvoretsky
Bridge Street, supra note 17.
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1. Defamation Generally
In the context of international human rights treaties, the right to
reputation tends to be a subset of the right to privacy.96 Outside the
treaty context, and not incongruously, it is also discussed as a feature
of the tort of defamation. 97 This section explores the latter while
saving close examination of the provisions of the given treaties for
discussion later on. It also weighs arguments against liability for
defamation due to freedom of expression concerns. As a general
point, this Note adopts the commonly held definition of defamation as
a public communication that negatively affects an individual’s
reputation.98 In Russian law specifically, klevetā is the umbrella tort
concept that translates equally as “defamation,” “libel,” and
“slander,” while a civil defamation claim would be based on
protections to “dignity, honor, and business reputation” or “intangible
goods” generally, which statutorily include integrity and good name.99
Legal academic discussions of defamation often highlight
concerns relating to the freedom of expression guaranteed in many
96. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
(hereinafter UDHR) art. 12 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”);
ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17 (“1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”); ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 8 (“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.”); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, American Convention on Human
Rights (Nov. 22 1969) [hereinafter American Convention] art. 11 (“1. Everyone has the right
to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. 2. No one may be the object of
arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his
correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. 3. Everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”).
97. See also Jerome H. Skolnick, The Sociological Tort of Defamation, 74 CALIF. L.
REV. 677 (1986) (placing reputation at the center of the tort concept of defamation); see
generally Bonnie Docherty, Defamation Law: Positive Jurisprudence, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
263 (2000) (asserting that the purpose of defamation law is to “protect reputation”).
98. See Docherty, supra note 97, at 265 (“Defamation is a public communication that
tends to injure the reputation of another”); TONY WEIR, TORT LAW 162 (2002).
99. See GKRF, infra note 119.
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jurisdictions, including Russia.100 These concerns emphasize concepts
like “open discussion” and the “marketplace of ideas,” relying on the
cliché of a “free press.” 101 Given Russia’s media ownership
landscape, where government-linked and -friendly entities have
effective control over the flow of information, these concerns are a
distraction. 102 Discussions focused on alleged risks to freedom of
expression posed by defamation law also assert that freedom of the
press — which is taken to mean ownership of the press by nongovernmental entities — is necessary for individuals to monitor
government actions and actors.103
Defamation is a “social” tort, while reputation is accepted as
“the esteem in which a person is held by others.” 104 Reputation is
sometimes discussed as either a form of property, or a form of
honor. 105 Within the property conception, damages are seen as
payment due to injury to a form of capital linked to an individual’s
“personal exertion.” 106 A market view of society is central to this
conception of reputation. 107 In a 1986 symposium piece on
defamation in the California Law Review, Robert C. Post asserts, “No
person has the right to a reputation other than that created by the
evaluative process of the market, and, conversely, every person
enjoys an equal right to enter the market to attempt to achieve what
reputation he can.”108 Elements of this conception of reputation and

100. See Docherty, supra note 97, at 264 (asserting that defamation liability is inherently
a restriction on freedom of expression); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
785-86 (2d ed. 1988) (asserting same).
101. See generally Docherty, supra note 97 (weighing concerns related to the protection
of freedom of expression); Tribe, supra note 100.
102. RIA Novosti, supra note 28 (showing plurality of Kremlin and Kremlin-friendly
holdings in media); Who Owns the Media in Russia: Leading Holdings, supra note 28
(showing same).
103 . See, e.g., Docherty, supra note 97 (referring to the press as a “watchdog”);
Skolnick, supra note 97, at 679 (discussing various academic positions on the press' duty to
oversee the conduct of public officials).
104. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation
and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691 (1986) (asserting that the concept of reputation is
inseparable from social relations); Skolnick, supra note 97 (stressing the need to examine the
“social purpose” of defamation law). Reputation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2010).
105. See Post, supra note 104.
106. J. HAWES, LECTURES ADDRESSED TO THE YOUNG MEN OF HARTFORD AND NEW
HAVEN 95 (Hartford 1828); Post, supra note 104, at 695 (developing the property conception).
107. Post, supra note 104, at 696-97 (discussing the “concept of reputation as property”).
108. Id.

2016]

THE CASE FOR BORIS NEMTSOV

1309

society are pertinent to Mr. Nemtsov’s case, as are elements of the
“honor” conception.
In the “honor” notion of reputation, the value of one’s good
name transcends its potential value in the marketplace. 109 A more
ancient conception, the “honor” understanding of reputation comports
more closely with Mr. Nemtsov’s case because it considers an
individual’s specific place in society and the benefits of the social role
he plays.110 That is, while his place in society may be a result of his
own efforts, his reputation is a reflection of the regard in which
society holds that social role.111 Loss of honor, as in Mr. Nemtsov’s
case, “is a fall from grace in the most comprehensive sense – loss of
face in the community, but also a loss of self and separation from the
basic norms that govern human life.”112 In this conception, damages
for defamation are seen as a method of vindication, or of restoring
honor. 113 Note that both the ICCPR and Russian Constitution and
Civil Code provisions on the right to reputation refer to “honor,”
while the Civil Code provision refers additionally to “dignity.”114
2. Right to Reputation in Russian Federal Statutory Law
The civil-political and human rights provisions of the Russian
Constitution often track those of the international human rights
conventions. 115 This holds true as it concerns the Russian
109. Id.
110. Proverbs 22:1 (“A good name is more desirable than great riches; to be esteemed is
better than silver or gold.”); MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 186-88 (1998).
111. Post, supra note 104, at 700 (claiming that an individual, in return for his social
status, personally receives from others the “regard and estimation that society accords to that
role”).
112. PETER L. BERGER, THE HOMELESS MIND: MODERNIZATION AND CONSCIOUSNESS
90 (1973).
113 . Post, supra note 104, at 702 (describing a conception of defamation law as
concerned primarily with the preservation of social status).
114. Compare ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17 (“unlawful attacks on his honour and
reputation”) with KRF, supra note 11, at art. 23 (“protection of honor and good name”) and
GKRF, infra note 119, at art. 150(1) (“personal dignity” and “honor and good name”).
115 . Compare KRF, supra note 11, at art. 23 (“1. Everyone has the right to the
inviolability of private life, personal and family secrets, and the protection of his honor and
good name. 2. Everyone has the right to privacy of his correspondence, telephone
conversations, mail, telegraph, and other messages. Limitations to this right are permitted only
by court order.”) with ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17 (“1. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of
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Constitution’s protections against attacks on an individual’s
reputation when compared with the relevant ICCPR provision.116 In
this connection, the Russian Constitution asserts stronger protections
to reputation than even the ECHR.117 The Russian Criminal Code (the
“Criminal Code”) includes a fairly detailed provision on defamation,
with increased liability where the target of slanderous accusations is
alleged to have committed a serious crime, a salient point for Mr.
Nemtsov’s case, as explained later.118 The Russian Civil Code (the
“Civil Code”), meanwhile, protects reputation in two subdivisions.119
the law against such interference or attacks.”) and ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 8 (“1. Everyone
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2.
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.”).
116 . Compare KRF, supra note 11, at art. 23 (“1. Everyone has the right to the
inviolability of private life, personal and family secrets, and the protection of his honor and
good name. 2. Everyone has the right to privacy of his correspondence, telephone
conversations, mail, telegraph, and other messages. Limitations to this right are permitted only
by court order.”) with ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17 (“1. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks.”)
117 . Compare KRF, supra note 11, at art. 23 (“1. Everyone has the right to the
inviolability of private life, personal and family secrets, and the protection of his honor and
good name. 2. Everyone has the right to privacy of his correspondence, telephone
conversations, mail, telegraph, and other messages. Limitations to this right are permitted only
by court order.”) with ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 8 (“1. Everyone has the right to respect for
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference
by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”).
118 . Федеральный закон N 63-ФЗ, Уголовный кодекс Российской Федерации
[Federal Law No. 63-FZ, The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation] (as amended July 6,
2016) (Russ.) [hereinafter UKRF] art. 128.1 (“Defamation connected with an accusation of the
commission of a serious or especially serious crime is punishable by a fine of up to five
million rubles, or the salary or other income of a period of up to three years, or by compulsory
labor for a term of up to four hundred and eighty hours.”).
119 . Федеральный закон N 51-ФЗ, Гражданский кодекс Российской Федерации
[Federal Law No. 51-FZ, The Civil Code of the Russian Federation] (as amended July 3, 2016)
(Russ.) [hereinafter GKRF] art. 150.1 (“Life and health, personal dignity, personal integrity,
honor and good name, goodwill" and "other intangible goods belonging to a citizen from birth,
or by law, are inalienable and non-transferable in any other way.”); id. at art. 150.2 (“In cases
and in a manner prescribed by law, intangible goods belonging to the deceased, may be
protected by other persons.”); id. at art. 152.1 (“A citizen is within his rights to demand the
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In one, the Civil Code protects Russian nationals’ “dignity” and
“honor,” and gives them the right to the refutation of defamatory
allegations in the medium used to disseminate the claims in the first
place.120 In the other, it protects the individual’s “intangible goods,”
which include honor and good name.121
When it comes to use of mass media to defamatory ends, the
Russian Supreme Court’s conceptual definition of false information
— or, as directly translated from the Russian legal literature,
“information not corresponding to reality” — is clear generally, but
prohibitively difficult to render in English. 122 The Supreme Court
holds, essentially, that statements alleging facts and events that did
not happen “in reality,” during the time period in which they are
alleged to have happened, qualify as false. 123 Of course, the false
allegations must have some negative effect on the dignity, honor, or
business reputation of the target in order to be actionable.124
a. Honor: Definitions and Implementation in the Russian Constitution
The current Russian Constitution, effective as of 1993, is the
jurisdiction’s supreme law. 125 It is split into two sections, the first
made up of nine chapters and the second made up of one. 126 The
provisions of the first chapter discuss the basis of the federal
refutation of a discredit to his honor, dignity or business reputation, if such disseminated
statements are not proven true. Rebuttal should be done by the same means used to circulate
information about the citizen, or other similar means.”).
120. Id. at art. 152.
121. Id. at art. 150.
122. See the Facebook discussion between the author and, among others, the director of
Human Rights Watch Russia and one of Russia's most prominent litigators at international
human rights tribunals, regarding how to translate the provision to English, with the latter
stating that any attempt to do so would be “impossible.” Thomas Callahan, FACEBOOK (Nov.
6, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/RovingBlade/posts/10101219752672770. The original
Russian is, “Не соответствующими действительности сведениями являются утверждения
о фактах или событиях, которые не имели места в реальности во время, к которому
относятся оспариваемые сведения.” (Quoting the Plenary Directive, supra note 3.)
123. Plenary Directive, supra note 3, at 4 (stating that “[u]ntrue information constitutes
statements of facts or events that did not occur in reality” at the time they are alleged to have
occurred).
124. GKRF, supra note 119, at art. 152.
125. KRF, supra note 11, at art. 15 (“1. The Constitution of the Russian Federation shall
have supreme juridical force, direct action and shall be used on the whole territory of the
Russian Federation. Laws and other legal acts adopted in the Russian Federation shall not
contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation.”).
126. See generally id.
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constitutional system, including the hierarchy of jurisdictions within
and across regions; the separation of the executive from the
legislature and judiciary; and the establishment of a secular
government. 127 The second chapter is entitled Human and Civil
Rights and Freedoms, and in addition to protections to reputation it
also includes the right to privacy, the freedom of expression,
protections on minority languages and cultures, a ban on torture, and
other human rights provisions.128 The third chapter explains Russia’s
federal structure – the methods of legislation, the role of the Central
Bank, the status of the autonomous regions, and so on.129 Subsequent
chapters lay out various administrative features of the Russian
government, the rights and duties of the Russian Federation as a
sovereign jurisdiction, as well as various other questions of
governance.130
Article 23 of the Russian Constitution, the sixth of forty-seven
articles in the Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms chapter, protects
the right to privacy. 131 Article 23.1, the section relevant to the
discussion here, states, in full: “Everyone shall have the right to the
inviolability of his private life, personal and family privacy, and
protection of his honor and reputation.” 132 The Russian Plenary
Supreme Court’s 2005 directive on practical application of civil
defamation law (the “Plenary Directive”), discussed in greater detail
later on, refers first and foremost to Article 23 of the Constitution.133
127 . See id. at arts. 1-16 (“Chapter 1. The Fundamentals of the Constitutional
System[.]”).
128. See id. at arts. 17-64 (“Chapter 2. Rights and Freedoms of Man and Citizen[.]”).
129. See id. at arts. 65-79 (“Chapter 3. The Federal Structure[.]”).
130. See id. at arts. 80-137 (“Chapter 4. The President of the Russian Federation (Art.
80-93); Chapter 5. The Federal Assembly (Art. 94-109); Chapter 6. The Government of the
Russian Federation (Art. 110-117); Chapter 7. Judicial Power (Art. 118-129); Chapter 8. Local
Self-government (Art. 130-133); Chapter 9. Constitutional Amendments and Review of the
Constitution (Art. 134-137)”).
131. KRF, supra note 11, at art. 23 (“1. Everyone has the right to the inviolability of
private life, personal and family secrets, and the protection of his honor and good name. 2.
Everyone has the right to privacy of his correspondence, telephone conversations, mail,
telegraph, and other messages. Limitations to this right are permitted only by court order.”).
132. Id. The final clause of the provision literally protects “доброе имя” (dobroe imya),
which translates directly to “good name” but, as in English, indirectly to “reputation.” The
other provision of Article 23 protects privacy of correspondence subject to limitation by a
court order.
133. Plenary Directive, supra note 3, ¶ 1 (opening the Plenary Directive with, “Pursuant
to Article 23 of the Russian Constitution”).
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Russia also has various Constitutional Laws, with one of
particular concern for the purposes of this Note: the Federal
Constitutional Law on the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
(the “Law on the Supreme Court”).134 Article 5 of this statute outlines
the makeup and authority of the Plenary Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation (the “Plenary Supreme Court”), on whose
directive on civil defamation this Note relies in multiple instances.135
The Plenary Supreme Court, inter alia, issues decrees on judicial
application of statutory law. 136 It is made up of the heads of the
judicial boards of the Supreme Court — the Chairman, First Deputy
Chairman, and Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation. 137 Others who may participate in plenary proceedings
include, but are not limited to, the Prosecutor General, the Minister of
Justice, the President of the Constitutional Court, and additional
judges of the Constitutional Court or other Russian courts. 138 The
Plenary Supreme Court has the authority to appoint various judicial
offices across jurisdictions within Russia, as well as to review
executive petitions to initiate criminal proceedings. 139 The most
134 . Федеральный конституционный закон от 05.02.2014 N 3-FKZ (ред. от
04.11.2014) “О Верховном Суде Российской Федерации” (Federal Constitutional Law of
02/05/2014 No. 3-FKZ (as amended 11/04/2014) “On the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation”) [hereinafter Law on the Supreme Court] (Russ.).
135. Id. at art. 5.
136. See, e.g., Plenary Directive, supra note 3.
137 . Law on the Supreme Court, supra note 134, at art. 5.1 (“The Plenum of the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation shall consist of the Chairman of the Supreme Court
of the Russian Federation, the First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation, the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation — the
chairmen of the judicial boards of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, referred to in
paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Federal Constitutional Law … and judges of the Supreme Court
of the Russian Federation.”).
138. Id. at art 5.3.2 (“The Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
addresses issues related to implementation, in accordance with Article 104 of the Constitution
of the Russian Federation granted to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, of the
legality of legislative initiatives on issues within its jurisdiction.”).
139. Id. at art. 5.3.4 (“The Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
selects, by referral from the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, a
Secretary of the Plenum of the Supreme Court from the judges of the Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation for a period of three years. The same judge may be elected Secretary of the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation multiple times.”); id. at art. 5.3.5 (“[A]pproves the
composition of the Judicial Board on Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation, the Judicial Board on Civil Cases of the Supreme Court, the Judicial
Collegium for Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court, the Judicial Board on Economic Disputes
of the Supreme Court, the Judicial Board for military personnel of the Supreme Court
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pertinent subdivision of Article 5 of the Law on the Supreme Court
for this Note, though, is Article 5.3.1-2, which authorizes the Plenary
Supreme Court to “provide the courts with explanations on judicial
practice in order to ensure uniform application of the legislation of the
Russian Federation,” and to “resolve issues related to
implementation” of the law.140 The decree On Court Practice in Cases
of Protection of the Honor and Dignity of Citizens, as well as
Goodwill of Citizens and Legal Persons, issued in 2005, does exactly
this.141
b. Defamation: Attacks on Reputation in the Russian Criminal Code
Russian federal law is generally reported thematically in
collected codes, for example the Criminal Code, the Labor Code, the
Administrative Code, et cetera. They are all updated often to
accommodate new legal concepts or to expand or narrow existing
provisions. 142 The primary current provision of Russian federal
criminal law treating defamation, Article 128.1 of the Criminal Code,

Federation (hereinafter the Judicial Board of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation),
and the transfer of judges from one judicial board of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation to another judicial board of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.”); id. at
art. 5.3.9 (“[A]pproves, by referral of the Chairman of the appropriate court, the personal
composition of the Supreme Court of the republic, territorial, regional court, federal court,
court of an autonomous region, court of an autonomous district, military court, tribunal,
District Appellate Court, Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, or court of intellectual
property rights.”); id. at art. 5.3.8 (“[A]pproves, in connection with referrals from the President
of the Russian Federation, the composition of the judicial collegium of judges of the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation, adopted in accordance with the Criminal Procedural Code of
the Russian Federation concluded in the actions of the Prosecutor General of the Russian
Federation and (or) the Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation,
the elements of a crime for a decision to initiate criminal proceedings against given
individuals, or to make a decision about bringing them as defendants in a criminal case, if the
criminal case was instituted against others.”).
140. Id. at art. 5.3.1-2 (“The Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 1)
examines the materials of analysis and summary of judicial practice and gives courts
explanations on judicial practice in order to ensure uniform application of the legislation of the
Russian Federation; 2) resolves issues related to implementation, in accordance with Article
104 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, granting the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation the right of legislative initiative on issues within its jurisdiction.”).
141. Plenary Directive, supra note 3.
142. See, for example, ConsultantPlus entry for UKRF, supra note 118, at ch. 17, which
includes defamation, showing amendments in 1999, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, and
2013, http://www.consultant.ru/popular/ukrf/10_25.html#p1791.
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came into force in June 2012. 143 A brief article consisting of five
sections that vary liability by circumstance, it defines defamation as
“the spread of false information discrediting the honor and dignity of
another person or undermining his reputation.” 144 The language is
analogous to that of the Russian Civil Code's reputation provision,
discussed below. Importantly for Mr. Nemtsov’s case, Article 128.1
does not address, and therefore does not bar, posthumous defamation
claims.145 The Supreme Court has confirmed this understanding of the
law, stating expressly that there is no statute of limitations on such
claims.146
Russia’s criminal laws often feature varying levels of liability
depending on the context of the offense. Under Article 128.1.2,
defamation carries liability of up to RUB1,000,000, one year’s salary
or other income, or forced labor of up to 240 hours when carried out
by use of the media or other public means of expression.147 Article
128.1.5 increases criminal penalties to RUB5,000,000, three years’
salary or defamer’s other income, or up to 480 hours of forced labor if
the defamation contains accusations that the target committed an
“especially serious crime.” 148 What constitutes such a crime is not
defined in the law.149 The likely especially serious crime of treason,
though, which is the subject of Article 275 of the Criminal Code,
includes “other assistance” to “a foreign state, an international or
143 . Путин подписал закон "О клевете" (Putin Signs Law “On Defamation”),
INTERFAX (July 30, 2012, 2:20 PM), http://www.interfax.ru/russia/258078 (reporting on new
defamation law of July 2012); UKRF, supra note 118, at art. 128.1 (Defamation),
CONSULTANTPLUS
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/8a73d26dba7976d6c43cc94aa151
5368fef256f0/ (showing entry into force of July 28, 2012).
144. The English words “defamation,” “slander,” and “libel” all translate to “клевета”
(kleveta) in Russian. Kleveta is the title of Article 128.1. In order to avoid confusion given the
nuances between these English words, I have chosen to use the more general “defamation” for
the purposes of this Note.
145. UKRF, supra note 118, at art. 128 (not stating exhaustion of a cause of action
concurrent with the death of the target of defamation).
146. Plenary Directive, supra note 3 (allowing representatives of a target of defamation
to bring a case after his death).
147. UKRF, supra note 118, at art. 128.1.2. In August 2016, RUB1,000,000 equaled US
$15,080.
148 . Id. at art. 128.1.5 (“Defamation in combination with an accusation of the
commission of a serious or especially serious crime is punishable by a fine of up to five
million rubles or the salary or other income of a period of up to three years, or by compulsory
labor for a term of up to four-hundred and eighty hours.”)
149. Id.
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foreign organization or its representatives in activities directed against
the security of the Russian Federation.” 150 The Russian media in
question accused Mr. Nemtsov of at least participating in a conspiracy
to stoke unrest in Russia at the bidding of non-Russian interests,
actions that would tend to fit this description.151 Treason is the first
provision in the section of the Criminal Code entitled Crimes Against
the Foundations of Constitutional Order and State Security, and is
punishable by a mandatory minimum twelve-year prison term.152
The Russian Criminal Procedural Code sets out three different
kinds of criminal prosecutions: public, private-public, and private.153
Given the individual injury following defamation, Article 128
proceedings fall under the final category, which means that private
individuals have the right to petition for criminal charges against
other individuals they allege to have engaged in criminal defamation
against them.154 Litigants in a Russian criminal defamation action also
have the option to resolve the complaint in “reconciliation.”155 The
relevant procedural statute even designates a room to be used for this
purpose.156
In its 2013 report to the Committee on its ICCPR compliance,
Russia notes several articles of the Criminal Code that, it asserts, are

150. Id. at art. 275. “High treason” includes “providing financial, material, technical,
advisory or other assistance to a foreign state, an international or foreign organization or their
representatives in activities directed against the security of the Russian Federation” and is
punishable by a minimum 12 and maximum 20 years in prison, plus a fine of up to
RUB500,000 or the equivalent of three years' salary or other income. Id.
151. Nechepurenko, supra note 5 (providing a general idea of the claims levied against
Mr. Nemtsov in Russian media).
152. UKRF, supra note 118, at art. 275 (“High Treason”).
153. Федеральный Закон N 174-ФЗ, Уголовно-процессуальный кодекс Российской
Федерации [Federal Law No. 174-FZ, Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation]
(as amended July 6, 2016) (Russ.) [hereinafter UPKRF] art. 20.1 (“Depending on the nature
and severity of the crime, a prosecution, including prosecution in court, shall be carried out as
public, private-public, and private.”).
154. Id. at art. 20.2 (“Criminal cases involving crimes under Articles 115 part one, 116
part one, and 128.1 part one of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation are considered
criminal cases of private prosecution, initiated only at the application of the victim or his legal
representative … subject to termination in connection with the reconciliation of the victim and
the accused. Reconciliation is allowed before the court in the deliberation room of the court.”).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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analogous to Article 17 of the Covenant.157 The report refers first to
Articles 138, 138.1, and 139 of the Criminal Code: the provisions on
violation of privacy of correspondence (by various electronic and
other means), the illegal sale of surveillance technology that could be
used for such violations, and violation of the inviolability of the
home, respectively. 158 Oddly, these provisions are contained in
Chapter 19 of the Criminal Code, which treats Crimes Against the
Constitutional Rights and Freedoms of the Person and Citizen. 159
However, civil law sections are addressed in a subsequent paragraph
of the report (which is discussed in greater detail below).160
The Criminal Code is not the only body of Russian federal
statutory law protecting the right to reputation. To that effect, the
following discussion explores protections to “dignity, honor, and
business reputation” as well as “intangible goods” including dignity
and honor in the Civil Code. The Supreme Court’s position regarding
the separate sources of liability is that neither the failure to bring a
criminal proceeding under Article 128, the closure of such a criminal
action, nor a verdict in any direction will bar a Russian claimant from
filing a civil defamation complaint on the same cause of action.161
c. Dignity: Intangible Goods and the Right to Rebuttal in the Russian
Civil Code
The Russian Civil Code addresses reputation in two separate
provisions.162 The first, Civil Code Article 150, is entitled Intangible
Goods. 163 It is followed by Article 152, which is entitled Right to
Protection of Honor, Dignity, and Goodwill. 164 The latter provides
157. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
under Article 40 of the Covenant, Seventh Periodic Reports of States Parties: Russian
Federation, U.N. Doc. CCPR/RUS/7 (Jan. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Russian Periodic Report].
158. Id.
159. UKRF, supra note 118, at ch. 19 (“Crimes Against the Constitutional Rights and
Freedoms of Person and Citizen[.]”).
160. Russian Periodic Report, supra note 157, ¶ 104.
161. Plenary Directive, supra note 3, ¶ 24 (“[R]efusal to initiate criminal proceedings
under Article 129 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the termination of a
criminal case, as well as the imposition of a sentence does not exclude the possibility of
bringing an action to protect the honor and dignity or business reputation in civil
proceedings.”).
162. GKRF, supra note 119, at arts. 150, 152.
163. Id. at art. 150 (“Intangible Goods”).
164. Id. at art. 152 (“Protection of Honor, Dignity, and Goodwill”).
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significantly stronger civil protections. 165 Where Russia’s Criminal
Code provision creates liability only after defamation has been
established, the Civil Code creates liability unless the alleged defamer
proves the truth of the allegations.166 The Civil Code provisions both
clarify the rights of Russian nationals against defamation, as well as
the non-criminal obligations of those making claims that are alleged
to be damaging to another’s reputation.167
Article 150 mirrors provisions of both the UDHR and the
ICCPR by protecting a given individual's honor or reputation.168 For
example, it states as inalienable and otherwise nontransferable the
following rights: life, health, personal dignity and integrity, honor and
good name, goodwill, privacy, the home, personal and family secrets,
freedom of movement, freedom to choose place of residence, and
name.169 However, unlike the specific civil liabilities named in Article

165. Compare id. at art. 150 (“1. Life and health, personal dignity, personal integrity,
honor and good name, goodwill” and “other intangible goods belonging to a citizen from birth,
or by law, are inalienable and non-transferable in any other way. 2. In cases and in a manner
prescribed by law, intangible goods belonging to the deceased, may be protected by other
persons.”) with id. at art. 152 (“1. A citizen shall have the right to demand, in court, the
refutation of defamation to his honor, dignity or business reputation, if such statements are not
proven to be true. Rebuttal should be done by the same means used to circulate the information
about the citizen, or by other similar means. At the request of interested persons, the protection
of honor, dignity and business reputation of a citizen is permitted after his death. 2.
Information defaming the honor, dignity or business reputation of a citizen in popular media
must be refuted in the same mass media. The citizen ... is entitled to ... publish his response in
the same mass media.”; “9. A citizen who has been targeted with information defaming his
honor, dignity or business reputation, along with the refutation of that information or the
publication of his response, is entitled to claim damages and compensation for moral damages
caused by the proliferation of the information.”).
166. Id. at art. 152 (“The citizen is within his rights to demand, at court, the refutation of
statements discrediting his honor, dignity, or business reputation if the disseminator of such
statements does not prove that they are true.”).
167. See generally id. at art. 150, 152.
168. Compare id. at art. 150 (“Life and health, personal dignity, personal integrity, honor
and good name, goodwill” and “other intangible goods belonging to a citizen from birth, or by
law, are inalienable and non-transferable in any other way.”) with UDHR, supra note 96, at art.
12 (“No one shall be subjected to ... to attacks upon his honour and reputation.”) and ICCPR,
supra note 7, at art. 17 (“No one shall be subjected to ... unlawful attacks on his honour and
reputation.”).
169. GKRF, supra note 119, at art. 150.1 (“Life and health, personal dignity, personal
integrity, honor and good name, goodwill, privacy, home, personal and family secrets, freedom
of movement, freedom of choice of place of residence, name, authorship, and other intangible
goods, which belong to a citizen from birth or by law, are inalienable and non-transferable in
any other way.”).
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152, Article 150 only provides for injunctions against continued
violations.170
According to a plain reading of Article 152, the burden of proof
falls on the complainant in a Russian civil defamation action.171 “A
citizen shall have the right to demand refutation” of claims
discrediting his honor, dignity or business reputation if such
disseminated statements are proven false, states Article 152.1.172 Once
falsity is established, a rebuttal “should be done by the same means
through which the information was circulated” about the
complainant.173 This applies to mass media, as in Mr. Nemtsov’s case,
with one additional protection measure for the target of defamation.174
While the refutation of the slanderous allegations must be published
or disseminated in the same mass media that was used to make them,
the target of defamation is also given the right to publish his own
response to the claims in that very medium.175
In its 2013 report to the Committee on ICCPR compliance,
Russia addresses civil reputation and honor violations in the context
of the Plenary Directive.176 There, Russia asserts that cases addressing
unauthorized dissemination of damaging but truthful information
about an individual’s private life may lead a court to award money
damages pursuant to Article 151 of the Civil Code.177 Meanwhile, an
individual could claim both the refutation of the slanderous claims,
but also could be entitled to money damages under Article 152 of the
Civil Code.178 All of this, Russia asserts, is its legislative method of

170. See id. at art. 150.2 (“Intangible goods are protected in accordance with this Code
and other laws in the instances and in the manner provided, as well as in those cases and to the
extent to which the use of methods of protecting civil rights (Article 12) follows from the
nature of the impaired intangible goods or personal non-property rights and the nature of the
consequences of this violation.”).
171. Id. at art. 152.1 (“A citizen shall have the right to demand, in court, the refutation of
defamation to his honor, dignity or business reputation, if such statements are not proven to be
true.”).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at art. 152.2 (“Information defaming the honor, dignity or business reputation of
a citizen in popular media, must be refuted in the same mass media. The citizen ... is entitled to
... publish his response in the same mass media.”).
176. Russian Periodic Report, supra note 157, ¶ 104.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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incorporating the protections of Article 17 of the ICCPR into its
domestic law.179
One of the most important procedural provisions in all of
Russian law as it concerns Mr. Nemtsov’s case is as follows: actions
in pursuance of the protection of dignity, honor, and business
reputation are brought “at the demand of interested persons,” which is
not limited to the target of the defamatory claims.180 This is because,
under Article 152.2 of the Civil Code, the protection of a Russian
citizen’s dignity and honor continues “after his death.” 181 That is,
unlike in some other jurisdictions, subject matter jurisdiction over
civil defamation claims is not extinguished with the death of the
target of defamation.182 The Supreme Court clarified this point in the
Plenary Directive, stating, “for example, relatives and heirs”
constitute “interested persons” in the context of Article 152.2. 183
Article 150 mirrors this concept by declaring that “other persons”
may pursue protection of intangible goods “belonging to the
deceased.”184
d. The Right to Information in the Mass Media Law
Litigants on behalf of Mr. Nemtsov should be aware of one
provision in Russia’s federal Law on Mass Media, in the case that the
Russian Federation asserts it as an affirmative defense.185 Article 38
of the Law on Mass Media, in particular, protects the Russian public’s
right of access to information.186 While two latter subdivisions of the
law address government transparency generally, the first subdivision
gives Russian citizens the right to “promptly receive…reliable
179. Id. ¶ 102. Note that even in this explanation to the Committee, Russia asserts
observance of European Court norms in its application of its own domestic laws.
180. GKRF, supra note 119, at art. 152.2 (“At the request of interested persons, the
protection of honor, dignity and business reputation of a citizen is permitted after his death.”).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Plenary Directive, supra note 3, ¶ 13 (“At the request of interested parties (for
example relatives, heirs) the protection of a citizen's honor and dignity is permitted after his
death (paragraph 1 of Art. 152 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.”).
184. GKRF, supra note 119, at art. 150.2 (“In cases and in a manner prescribed by law,
intangible goods belonging to the deceased may be protected by other persons.”).
185. Закон РФ от 27.12.1991 N 2124-1 (ред. от 15.07.2016) "О средствах массовой
информации" [Law of the Russian Federation from 12/27/1991 No. 2124-1 (as amended July
15, 2016) “On Mediums of Mass Information” (Russ.) [hereinafter Mass Media Law].
186. Id. at art. 38 (“The Right to Receive Information”).
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information” from the media on the activities of not only government
agencies but also “public officials,” a term that could in some senses
be used to characterize Mr. Nemtsov at the time of the media
campaign in question given his leadership role in a registered political
party.187
3. Right to Reputation in the International Human Rights Context
The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has held,
including in the Plenary Directive, that “recognized” principles and
norms of international law, including treaties to which the Russian
Federation is party, constitute foundations of the Russian legal
system. 188 As it so happens, privacy, reputation, and honor are all
variously protected in the regional and global human rights treaties,
including those that Russia has ratified. 189 This section looks at
defamation in the context of the UDHR, which has no legal effect but
which was a prototype for many of the international agreements on
human rights that set legal standards on issues ranging from
reputation to sexual violence in conflict, for example; the ICCPR; and
the ECHR. The objective is to illustrate generally the relevant
international understanding of reputation by highlighting the
similarities in language between the treaties.
After a discussion of the UDHR primarily for historicalcontextual purposes, the section discusses human rights treaties
covering reputation in descending order of relevance to the goal of the
paper. That is, the ICCPR, which creates the preferable tribunal where
Mr. Nemtsov’s family should file suit against the Russian Federation,
comes first. The European Convention on Human Rights, which
Russia has ratified, but which features less clear protections given the
absence of an explicit reputation provision, comes next.

187. Id. (“Citizens have the right to promptly receive, through mass media, reliable
information about the activities of state agencies, local governments, organizations, public
associations and their officials.”).
188. Plenary Directive, supra note 3, at 1 (naming both the ICCPR and the ECHR as
foundations of Russian law).
189. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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a. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Representatives from the Soviet Union participated in the twoyear drafting process eventually leading to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, which the United Nations General Assembly
adopted in 1948. 190 The UDHR is a thirty-provision outline of
universal rights that has subsequently been elaborated through various
United Nations treaties.191 But though its representatives participated
in drafting the UDHR, the Soviet Union was one of eight States (six
of them nominally socialist) to abstain from voting for its adoption at
the General Assembly.192 All the same, the Russian Federation is now
party to multiple legally binding treaties that more specifically and
strictly protect rights outlined in the UDHR.193
Article 12 of the UDHR reads, “No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”194 Regardless of, or perhaps given, the sheer
breadth of rights protected, the UDHR is “morally, but not legally
binding” on States given its status as a declaration of the United
Nations General Assembly.195 The rights it calls on States to protect

190 . See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002); UDHR, supra
note 96.
191. See generally UDHR, supra note 96.
192. Peter Danchin, Drafting History, COLUM. U. CTR. FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING,
http://ccnmtl.columbia.edu/projects/mmt/udhr/udhr_general/drafting_history_10.html (noting
the Soviet Union's role in the drafting of the UDHR); Glen Johnson, Development of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, RAZVITIE LICHNOSTI, http://rl-online.ru/articles/403/224.html (noting same).
193. Russia has ratified the Genocide Convention, CERD, the ICESCR and ICCPR, the
Apartheid Convention, CEDAW, the CAT, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, the Slavery Convention, and the
Trafficking Convention, among many others. Treaty Participation search, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/TreatyParticipantSearch.aspx?tab=UN
(select “Russian Federation” in “Participant” menu).
194. Compare UDHR, supra note 96, at art. 12, with ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17.
195 . BRUNO SIMMA AND PHILIP ALSTON, THE SOURCES OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
CUSTOM, JUS COGENS, AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES 82-108 (1992) (describing the UDHR as
non-binding); Hilary Charlesworth, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), MAX
PLANCK ENCYC. PUB. INT’L L. (Feb. 2008), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e887?rskey=ZnPaBZ&result=1&prd=EPIL
(noting the UDHR's non-binding authority).
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are now protected more specifically in other legally binding treaties,
though, for example the ICCPR, the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and
others.196
b. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its
Individual Complaint Component
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was
passed at the UN General Assembly in December 1966.197 It creates
obligations on States Parties to protect the various civil and political
rights of individuals subject to the State Party’s jurisdiction.198 The
ICCPR took legal effect in March 1976 pursuant to Article 49, which
gives the treaty authority following ratification by thirty-five States.199
An early party to the Covenant, the Soviet Union — the Russian
Federation’s legal predecessor — signed in 1968 and ratified in
1973. 200 Among other requirements, States Parties to the Covenant
must report on their compliance whenever the Committee requests
such a report, as in the Russian Federation’s report mentioned
previously in this Note.201
Article 28 of the ICCPR creates the United Nations Human
Rights Committee. 202 Under Article 28, the Committee has the
authority to clarify provisions of the Covenant by request, to conduct
mandatory regular reviews of State Party compliance with the
Covenant, and — more importantly to the purposes of this Note —
196. UDHR, supra note 96, at art. 5 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
197. ICCPR, supra note 7 (“[E]ntry into force 23 March 1976[.]”).
198. Id. at pmbl.
199. Id. at art. 49 (“The present Covenant shall enter into force three months after the
date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth
instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.”); infra note 208.
200. Status as of Jan. 14, 2016 (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights),
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter ICCPR Status] (showing the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' ratification in 1973).
201. ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 40(1)(b) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights
recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights … whenever the
Committee so requests” after the first year of authority.).
202. Id. at art. 28(1) (“There shall be established a Human Rights Committee (hereafter
referred to in the present Covenant as the Committee).”).
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take contentious jurisdiction over individuals’ claims that a State
Party has violated human rights protected under the Covenant.203 The
First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR allows the Committee to review
Communications, as complaints under its jurisdiction are called,
regarding State violations as long as an individual files the
Communication.204 That is, neither other States nor non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”) may litigate allegations of human rights
violations against a State at the Committee.205
Decisions at the Committee, which are called Committee Views
and may take years to be reached, are legally binding.206 Jurisdiction
over complaints is contingent on ratification of the First Optional
Protocol, which Russia has ratified and which is discussed in greater
detail in a later section of this Note.207 The Committee has reviewed a
very small number of Article 17 (right to privacy) complaints against
the Russian Federation, but has never found one concerning
reputation to be admissible.208
Like most of the major multiple-issue human rights treaties, the
ICCPR protects the right to reputation; Committee Views on the
matter tend to refer to “honor and reputation” together.209 In fact, the
ICCPR’s dual-provision Article 17 not only protects the right to
reputation, but requires States Parties also to give legal protection to
203. Id.
204. First Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 1 (“A State Party to the Covenant that
becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to
receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to
be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No
communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant
which is not a Party to the present Protocol.”).
205. Id.
206. J. TH. MOLLER & A. DA ZAYAS, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
CASE LAW, 1977-2008: A HANDBOOK 48 (2009) (“[T]he views constitute international case
law and, as such, may be considered as part of what is known as ‘hard law.’”).
207. Status as of Mar. 15, 2016 (Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights), UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en
[hereinafter
Optional Protocol Status] (showing the Russian Federation’s accession to the Optional
Protocol on Oct. 1, 1991).
208. For example, since the 114th Session (March 2012), the Committee has found two
Article 17 communications against the Russian Federation to be admissible. Human Rights
Committee Jurisprudence, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUM. RTS.,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/Jurisprudence.aspx.
209. See e.g., Gilbert Martinez and Others v. Algeria, CCPR/C/109/D/1922/2009 ¶ 3.1
(Dec. 2, 2013) (discussing “honor and reputation”).
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targets of defamation.210 Also, it is worth mentioning in relation to
Mr. Nemtsov’s case, the Committee holds that States Parties have a
positive obligation to protect individuals against violations of rights
protected by the ICCPR not only when committed by State agents (for
example state-run media), but by other individuals or private entities
(for example, so-called independent media).211
As in some other treaties, the ICCPR treats reputation within the
article on privacy. The first subdivision of Article 17 includes two
distinct protections in a single sentence: “arbitrary and unlawful
interference” with privacy, home, family, and correspondence is
barred alongside “unlawful attacks” on honor and reputation.212 The
second subdivision creates an important additional obligation on
ratifying States: “Everyone,” it reads, has the right to “protection of
the law against such interference or attacks.”213 The Soviet Union did
not address Article 17 in its handful of reservations to the ICCPR; the
Russian Federation has subsequently made no declaration or
understanding regarding the provision.214
The Committee has made clear in a General Comment on Article
17 that States Parties to the ICCPR have an obligation to protect
individuals from attacks on their reputation regardless of whether
such attacks “emanate” from the State or from “natural or legal
persons.”215 Further, the Committee notes that the inclusion of bans
210. ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17 (“1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.”).
211. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Gen. Comment No. 31, Nature of the General Legal
Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar.
29, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment 31] (“[T]he positive obligations on States Parties to
ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State,
not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by
private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they
are amenable to application between private persons or entities.”).
212. ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17(1) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his honour and reputation.”).
213. Id.
214 . See supra note 200 (showing States Parties' reservations, declarations, and
understandings to the ICCPR).
215. U.N. Int'l Hum. Rights Instruments, Comp. of Gen. Comments and Gen. Recs.
Adopted by the Hum. Rights Treaty Bodies Vol. 1, 191 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.
1) (May 27, 2008) [hereinafter General Comment 16] (“Article 17 provides for the right of
every person to be protected against arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
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on both “unlawful” and “arbitrary” interference with privacy (or,
more specifically, reputation) is intentional.216 That is, derogations on
the right to privacy may be permitted where required or allowed by
law — for example, in light of reasonable national security
concerns. 217 In the case of Mr. Nemtsov, the example would be
attacks on reputation by the press in light of concerns of a “fifth
column” bent on destabilizing the country, where restrictions on such
press would be barred by other sections of Russian law. However, the
Committee also holds that some “arbitrary” interferences may be
impermissible despite being otherwise lawful.218 States Parties must
ensure that “interference provided for by law should be in accordance
with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant,” and no
matter what, should be reasonable given the circumstances.219
The Russian Federation had an obligation under Article 17 of the
ICCPR to protect Mr. Nemtsov against the very public designation by
state media and others as an “internal enemy” and “national traitor” at
the head of a conspiracy to destabilize Russia. 220 There can be no
question that a State Party must not carry out attacks on an
individual’s reputation — an important consideration to be sure, but
not the central issue of this Note. The obligation to protect individuals
once such attacks have already taken place — especially where the
attacks are of such force as to culminate in that individual’s
assassination — is very clearly implicated in the case of Mr.
Nemtsov. Where there has been an attack on reputation, the
Committee holds that those responsible must be held as such.221

home or correspondence as well as against unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. In
the view of the Committee this right is required to be guaranteed against all such interferences
and attacks whether they emanate from State authorities or from natural or legal persons. The
obligations imposed by this article require the State to adopt legislative and other measures to
give effect to the prohibition against such interferences and attacks as well as to the protection
of this right.”).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Kramer, supra note 4; see also Nechepurenko, supra note 5; General Comment
16, supra note 215 (explaining defamation liability at the Committee).
221. General Comment 16, supra note 215, at 193 ¶ 11 (“Provision must also be made
for everyone effectively to be able to protect himself against any unlawful attacks that do
occur and to have an effective remedy against those responsible.”).
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The First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“Protocol”) is the complaint and recourse
mechanism for individuals facing State violations of rights protected
under the Covenant.222 The General Assembly adopted the Protocol in
December 1966; it took legal effect in March 1976. 223 Ratifying
States to the Protocol accept the Committee’s authority “to receive
and consider communications from individuals subject to its
jurisdiction” who allege the State in question violated one or multiple
provisions of the ICCPR.224 An individual filing a Communication is
referred to as its “author.”225 Once such a Communication has been
received and weighed, the Protocol requires States Parties to “submit
to the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the
matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken” in response
to the violation.226 Article 12 of the Protocol gives States Parties the
explicit right to denounce the Committee’s jurisdiction.227 No State,
however, has ratified the Protocol and subsequently denounced the
Committee’s jurisdiction.228
Russia acceded to the Protocol in the Soviet twilight, on October
1, 1991. 229 Moscow’s single declaration to the treaty establishes a
domestic exhaustion requirement and a requirement that only matters
not under consideration at other tribunals be considered at the

222. First Optional Protocol, supra note 6.
223. Id.
224. Id. at art. 1 (“A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present
Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications
from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State
Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication shall be received by the
Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party to the present
Protocol.”).
225. See Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006, infra note 305, at 1.1; Hum.
Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, infra note 305, at 1.1; and Hum. Rts. Comm.
Communication No. 1482/2006, infra note 305, at 1.1.
226. First Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 4.2 (“Within six months, the receiving
State shall submit to the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter
and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State.”).
227. Id. at art. 12.1 (“Any State Party may denounce the present Protocol at any time by
written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation
shall take effect three months after the date of receipt of the notification by the SecretaryGeneral.”).
228 . Optional Protocol Status, supra note 207 (showing States Parties and no
denunciations).
229. Id.
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Committee. 230 These requirements are already contained in Articles
5(2)(a) and 5(2)(b) of the Protocol.231 Hypothetically, the declaration
may have been an attempt to bypass the second clause of Article
5(2)(b), which waives the domestic exhaustion requirement “where
the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged;” the Soviet
justice system was notoriously slow. Russia became subject to the
Protocol’s jurisdiction simultaneously with the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in December 1991.232
The Committee first determines whether a Communication is
admissible. 233 Then, notwithstanding the domestic exhaustion and
exclusivity requirements, it raises the allegation with the State
Party.234 The State Party, in turn, has six months to submit in writing
any explanation or “statements clarifying” what it has done to remedy
the alleged violation.235

230. Id. (“The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, pursuant to article 1 of the Optional
Protocol, recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider
communications from individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, in respect of situations or events occurring after the date on which the Protocol
entered into force for the USSR. The Soviet Union also proceeds from the understanding that
the Committee shall not consider any communications unless it has been ascertained that the
same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or
settlement and that the individual in question has exhausted all available domestic remedies.”).
231. First Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 5 (“2. The Committee shall not consider
any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that: (a) The same matter is
not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement; (b)
The individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. This shall not be the rule where
the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.”).
TREATY COLLECTION,
232 . Historical
Information,
UNITED NATIONS
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx (“By a communication dated 24 December
1991, the President of the Russian Federation notified the Secretary-General that membership
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the United Nations is being continued by
the Russian Federation. The Government of the Russian Federation subsequently informed the
Secretary-General that as at 24 December 1991, the Russian Federation maintains full
responsibility for all the rights and obligations of the USSR under the Charter of the United
Nations and multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General and requested that the
name ‘Russian Federation’ be used in the United Nations in place of the name ‘Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics.’”).
233. First Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 4 (“Subject to the provisions of article
3, the Committee shall bring any communications submitted to it under the present Protocol to
the attention of the State Party to the present Protocol alleged to be violating any provision of
the Covenant.”).
234. Id.
235. Id.
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Neither organizations nor groups of individuals may submit
Communications to the Committee, though both prospects were
discussed in the drafting stage of the Protocol.236 Further, anonymous
submissions are barred.237 And though the preferred complainant is
the individual whose rights were allegedly violated, the Committee
accepts Communications from close relatives or other close associates
of the alleged victim.238 Further, legal and human rights organizations
commonly file supporting briefs with the Committee in conjunction
with individual Communications. 239 Pursuant to Article 5(1) of the
Protocol, the Committee will consider “all written information made
available to it” by the filing individual or the State Party

236. See U.N. Secretary-General, Annotations to the Draft International Covenant on
Human Rights, 10 U.N. GAOR Annex at 81, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955) (“Opinion was deeply
divided concerning the right to initiate proceedings before the committee. Some held that only
States should be allowed to appeal to the committee. Others proposed various ways of
enlarging the right to initiate proceedings. In resolution 421 (V), section F, the General
Assembly requested the Commission on Human Rights to consider provisions ‘to be inserted
in the draft covenant or in separate protocols, for the receipt and examination of petitions from
individuals and organizations with respect to alleged violations of the covenant’. Again, by
resolution 737 B(VIII), the Assembly transmitted to the Commission a proposal requesting it
to draft ‘provisions recognizing the right of petition of every natural person, every duly
constituted group of individuals and every recognized non-governmental organization’, for
inclusion in the covenant in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly in its
resolution 421 (V), section F, mentioned above. All the proposals, which would extend the
right to initiate proceedings, were either rejected or withdrawn.”); Report of the Ninth Session
of the Hum. Rts. Comm., 16 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 8), 16-17, U.N. Doc. E/2447 (1953)
(“[C]ertain non-governmental organizations could bring to the notice of the United Nations
matters falling within the purview of the Economic and Social Council and this recognition
should be taken into account in considering the admissibility of communications from nongovernmental organizations. To limit the right of complaint … would hamper the work which
those organizations were doing, and would make the United Nations appear isolated in the
eyes of many ordinary people. They strongly supported the proposals which empowered the
Committee to act on its own motion and to receive communications from non-governmental
organizations and individuals.”).
237. First Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 3 (“The Committee shall consider
inadmissible any communication under the present Protocol which is anonymous, or which it
considers to be an abuse of the right of submission of such communications or to be
incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant.”).
238. Pestaño, infra note 305. The parents of the alleged victim of rights violations by the
Philippines authored the Communication.
239 . Ida Lintel & Cedric Ryngaert, The Interface between Non-Governmental
Organisations and the Human Rights Committee, 15 INT'L COMMUNITY L. REV. 359, 361
(2013) (discussing generally the individual-focused nature of the ICCPR, with the common
practice of support in litigation by civil society organizations).
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respondent. 240 That is, either party may file supporting information
prepared by third parties in hopes of persuading the Committee.241
Prominent Russian civil rights litigators have asserted concerns
that the Committee Views are of a “very uncertain legal status.”242
Indeed, whether or not Committee Views constitute binding law is a
point of contention in the international legal literature. At the same
time the Committee asserts — and legal academics generally agree —
that Committee Views are hard, binding law.243
c. The European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights (formally the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, which is how the Supreme Court refers to it) is the Council
of Europe’s interstate human rights mechanism.244 All members of the
Council of Europe are States Parties to the Convention, and new
Council members are expected to ratify at their earliest opportunity.245
To be clear, the Convention is not a European Union (“EU”)
instrument: while having jurisdiction over many EU Member States,
it also binds non-EU Council of Europe members like Montenegro,
Norway, Turkey, and, for that matter, Russia. 246 Russia joined the
Council of Europe in February 1996.247
240. First Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 5(1) (“The Committee shall consider
communications received under the present Protocol in the light of all written information
made available to it by the individual and by the State Party concerned.”).
241. Id.
242. See correspondence on file with the author.
243. Moller & Da Zayas, supra note 206.
244. ECHR, supra note 7 (“The Governments signatory hereto, being members of the
Council of Europe [...], Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement
of greater unity between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be
pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ..., Have agreed as follows[.]”).
245. Conference Report Honouring of Commitments Entered into by Member States
When Joining the Council of Europe, PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, art. 9 (Apr. 14, 1994), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTMLen.asp?fileid=16442&lang=en (“The Assembly recalls in this connection that accession to the
Council of Europe must go together with becoming a party to the European Convention on
Human Rights. It therefore considers that the ratification procedure should normally be
completed within one year after accession to the Statute and signature of the Convention.”).
246. Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 005 (Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-
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Russian nationals sue often on human rights questions at the
European Court of Human Rights, the tribunal attached to the
Convention.248 However, the Convention does not explicitly protect
reputation.249 Article 8, the provision on the right to privacy, states
only that, “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.”250 Governments are
barred generally from interfering with the “exercise of this right”
during normal conditions under the Convention. 251 However, the
Convention allows derogation of the right to privacy and its auxiliary
rights in response to various public safety or security concerns.252 The
European Court sometimes reads protections against interference with
honor or reputation into Article 8, as discussed in a later section.
It is with these considerations in mind that representatives of Mr.
Nemtsov should litigate a defamation case on his behalf. Given the
very strong protections to reputation in Russian statutory law, they
would have a strong case within the Russian court system. If
exhausting the Russian court system fails to provide a favorable
result, the ICCPR and ECHR also provide protections. The following
Part outlines the very clear positions of Russia’s Supreme Court on
the application of defamation law in both the criminal and civil
contexts, while also looking at sample Committee and European
Court decisions with a view to understanding the possible outcomes
of a claim on Mr. Nemtsov’s behalf at those tribunals.

/conventions/treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=ZlxTjJin (“Treaty open for signature by the
member States of the Council of Europe and for accession by the European Union[.]”).
247. Id. (showing Russian membership beginning in 1996).
248. Decisions Concerning the Russian Federation, EUROPEAN CT. HUM. RTS. HUDOC,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"languageisocode":["ENG"],"respondent":["RUS"],"documentc
ollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]} (showing six decisions against Russia
in the first two weeks of 2016 alone).
249. ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 8 (“Right to respect for private and family life: 1.
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.”).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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III. REPUTATION IN RUSSIAN COURTS AND AT THE
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNALS
This Part explores the right to reputation at the Supreme Court of
the Russian Federation and at the two relevant international human
rights tribunals. This includes, first, deeper discussion of the Supreme
Court’s Plenary Directive on jurisprudential application of the right to
dignity, honor, and business reputation, to which the Note has
referred in brief on multiple previous occasions. The Plenary
Directive provides the baseline understanding of defamation law in
the Russian court system.253
Then, in order to illustrate in order of persuasive authority
relative to the objective of the Note overall, this Part first looks at the
totality of United Nations Human Rights Committee Views — three
decisions — treating Article 17 claims against the Russian
Federation; none was found admissible. It also examines the facts of
three example successful Article 17 claims founded on reputation and
honor at the Committee. It then looks at four example cases regarding
defamation at the European Court, to which Russia is a party, and at
which Russian nationals often litigate. Recall, though, that Article 8
of the European Convention only vaguely protects individuals from
“interference by a public authority” with “private and family life,” not
reputation.254 For that reason, successful cases on point with that of
Mr. Nemtsov are difficult to come by.255
1. Defamation in the Russian Courts
The Russian Plenary Supreme Court’s 2005 Resolution on
Judicial Practice in Cases on the Protection of Honor and Dignity of
Citizens and Goodwill of Citizens and Legal Entities (previously and
hereafter referred to as the “Plenary Directive”) should be seen as the
baseline understanding of defamation in Russian law. 256 In Russia,
253. Plenary Directive, supra note 3.
254. ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 8 (“Right to respect for private and family life[.]”).
255. Decisions Concerning Article 8, EUROPEAN CT. HUM. RTS. HUDOC,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["reputation"],"languageisocode":["ENG"],"article":["
8"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]} (limiting search to
include “reputation,” with results showing a total of 159 such cases against all ratifying parties,
including inadmissibility judgments).
256. See generally Plenary Directive, supra note 3; Todd Foglesong, The Dynamics of
Judicial (In)dependence in Russia in Judicial Independence in THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY:
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which is officially a civil law country but has been characterized as a
hybrid civil-common law jurisdiction, one court’s decisions are not
universally de jure binding on other courts. Lower courts do de facto
tend to follow higher courts’ decisions, though. The Supreme Court is
the country’s court of last resort in civil and criminal actions, and
compliance with Plenary directives is expected.257
The Plenary Directive begins by noting the right of all Russians
to honor and good name found in Article 23 of the Constitution.258 It
continues by noting that norms of international law, including
international agreements to which Russia is a party, are among the
foundations of the Russian legal system. 259 Among these
considerations is also the fact that the freedom to impart and receive
information is constitutionally protected in Russia; this question
comes up again and again in the Plenary Directive.260 Meanwhile, it
looks explicitly to the European Convention as a source of
clarification on questions of dignity and honor. 261 In fact, Russian
courts’ application of defamation provisions “shall be construed in
accordance with the legal position of the European Court of Human
Rights.” 262 This was also Russia’s stated position during its 2013
ICCPR compliance review at the Committee.263
One of the most relevant sections of the Plenary Directive for the
purposes of this Note is the subdivision on the dissemination of
untrue information.264 One initial procedural point in this section is
that heirs and representatives of a deceased target of defamation may
initiate proceedings under Article 152 of the Civil Code.265 Another is
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 65 (Peter H. Russell & David M.
O’Brien eds., 2001) (explaining the place of Supreme Court plenary directives generally).
257. KRF, supra note 11, at art. 126 (“The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
constitutes the highest federal organ on civil, criminal, administrative and other cases falling
under the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction.”).
258. Plenary Directive, supra note 3, ¶ 1 (opening the Plenary Directive with, “Pursuant
to Article 23 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation”).
259. Id. ¶ 2 (naming, specifically, the ICCPR and ECHR as “foundations” of Russian
law).
260 . Id. ¶ 2 (discussing the freedom of information); id. ¶ 9 (discussing statutory
restrictions to information in Russia).
261. Id. ¶ 3 (naming the ECHR as a persuasive source for defamation questions).
262. Id.
263. Russian Periodic Report, supra note 157, ¶ 102.
264 . Plenary Directive, supra note 3, ¶ 13 (beginning of the section on untrue
information).
265. Id.
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that anonymous defamatory allegations are not actionable, that is, the
target of defamation must be able to identify a party levying the
allegations.266
Later sections identify various other procedural questions in
defamation actions that directly concern the use of mass media for
defamatory purposes, as in Mr. Nemtsov’s case. 267 For example, a
section on defendants in such actions states that both the authors of
untrue defamatory statements as well as the “persons” who
disseminated the statements may be held liable. 268 If the
dissemination was through the media, the editors of the medium may
also be held liable. 269 If no author’s name is attached to the claim
(television news media was central to the character assassination
campaign against Mr. Nemtsov), the founder of the media company
may be liable. 270 Meanwhile, respondent is to cover the costs of
publishing refutations of defamatory allegations.271 There is no statute
of limitations on such claims against the editorial boards of media
shown to have engaged in defamation.272
Criminal and civil damages are simultaneously available to a
defamation claimant based on the same cause of action. 273
Meanwhile, judgment in favor of a criminal defamation defendant
does not preclude the plaintiff from pursuing civil damages on the
same cause of action.274 In order for a civil claim to be actionable, at
least one of two elements must be met: that the respondent distributed
the defamatory information about the plaintiff, and that the
266. Id.
267. Id. ¶¶ 19-21 (discussing defamation in the media).
268. Id. ¶ 19 (assigning liability for legal persons who make defamatory claims, as well
as those who disseminate such claims).
269. Id. ¶ 20 (assigning personal liability for editorial staff of media found to have
disseminated defamatory claims).
270 . Id. ¶ 21 (assigning personal liability for executives of media found to have
disseminated defamatory claims).
271. Id. ¶ 46 (assigning costs to respondent in a successful defamation action). Media is
also addressed in various other sections not important for this Note, for example that the
publishers or distributors of advertisements containing defamatory allegations are equally
liable under Article 152.
272. Id. ¶ 13 (extending liability to authors and editorial staff of media engaged in
defamation).
273. Id. ¶ 23 (allowing both civil and criminal liability for defamation on the same cause
of action).
274. Id. ¶ 24 (allowing for civil liability in tort following a failed criminal action on the
same defamation cause of action).
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defamatory allegations were untrue.275 If claimant is unable to prove
either, the court should decline jurisdiction over the claim. 276 In
addition to refutation of defamatory claims in a civil action, the
claimant is also entitled to compensatory damages. 277 In the
refutation, the respondent medium must identify which allegations
about the claimant were false. 278 Factors for consideration in
determining the amount of pecuniary damages include the nature and
content of the publication, as well as the extent of dissemination.279
Damages should be commensurate with the injury suffered, with a
view to avoiding unreasonable burdens on the freedom of
expression. 280 Meanwhile, due to a provision of the Russian
Constitution barring forced expression, a court may not compel a
defendant to apologize personally to a claimant.281
The Plenary Directive defines defamation in multiple ways, none
of which are mutually exclusive with the others. 282 One is that
defamation requires false information, which in turn consists of
assertions of purported fact that “did not occur in reality” at the time
they are alleged to have occurred.283 One definition relevant to Mr.
Nemtsov’s case is defamation as allegations that a “citizen has
committed a dishonest act,” or has engaged in “unethical behavior in
... political life.”284 The respondent in a civil defamation action must
prove the truthfulness of the defamatory allegations, while the
claimant must prove that the respondent, and not someone else, made
the allegations.285
275. Id. ¶ 30 (laying out the elements of a civil defamation cause of action).
276. Id. ¶ 25.
277. Id. ¶ 31 (assigning damages liability to defamation respondent in a successful case).
278. Id. ¶ 37 (requiring media engaged in defamation to publicly identify and refute
defamatory claims following an adverse action).
279. Id. ¶ 33 (outlining the range of liabilities depending on severity of the claim).
280. Id.
281. Id. ¶ 40 (noting that even in a successful defamation action, respondent may not be
compelled to apologize to claimant given Article 29's prohibition on forced expression).
However, a court may oversee a settlement between the parties where it would not be contrary
to public policy.
282. Id. ¶¶ 28-29 (defining defamation).
283 . Id. ¶ 28 (invoking the statutory definition of defamation noted on multiple
occasions in this Note).
284. Id. ¶ 29 (generally noting defamation liability for allegations that an individual
engaged in dishonest or criminal conduct).
285. Id. ¶ 33 (assigning burdens of proof on both claimant and respondent in a civil
defamation action).
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2. Privacy, Honor, and Reputation at the Human Rights Committee
As this Note went to publication, the Committee had considered
143 Communications against State Parties that in some way
incorporate a claim on Article 17, the ICCPR provision protecting
reputation.286 However, few of these Communications were both held
admissible and resulted in Committee Views favorable to the
complainant on the merits on the Article 17 cause of action. 287
Further, not only has no Article 17 claim against the Russian
Federation ever been found admissible, but only one Russian claimant
has ever submitted a reputation- or honor-based Communication to
the Committee.288 In order to anticipate the results of Mr. Nemtsov’s
Article 17 case at the Committee, this Part examines all three Article
17 claims against the Russian Federation along with three successful
Article 17 claims against other States Party to the ICCPR and the First
Optional Protocol.
a. The Unsuccessful Article 17 Claims against the Russian Federation
The Committee has accepted jurisdiction over Russian nationals’
cases including Article 17 claims on three occasions.289 However, it
did not find Russia to be in violation of Article 17 in any of them.290
Further, only one of the cases concerns reputation.291
In Khakdar v. Russia, the author, Kesmatulla Khakdar, was born
in Afghanistan, but having lived in Russia for two decades, he
disputed his deportation to Afghanistan as an unlawful interference

286 . Cases Concerning Article 17, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http://juris.ohchr.org/search/Documents (in “Body”, select “CCPR”; and in “Article”, select
“CCPR-17,” “CCPR-17-1”, and “CCPR-17-2”) (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
287. Id. (in the drop-down menu “Type of Decision”, select “Adoption of Views” in
order to filter out holdings on admissibility).
288. Id. (in the drop-down menu “State or Entity”, select “Russian Federation”); id. (in
the field “Keyword”, add “reputation”).
289. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 2126/2011 (Kesmatulla Khakdar v. Russia),
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/112/D/2126/2011 (Nov. 26, 2014); Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No.
1764/2008 (Zeydulla Vagab Ogly Alekperov v. Russia), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/109/D/1764/2008
(Dec. 2, 2013); Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1983/2010 (Y.B. v. Russia), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/110/D/1983/2010 (Apr. 23, 2014).
290. Id. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 2126/2011, supra note 289; Hum. Rts.
Comm. Communication No. 1764/2008, supra note 289; Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication
No. 1983/2010, supra note 289.
291. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1983/2010, supra note 289.
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with his private life in violation of Article 17 of the ICCPR.292 He was
found to have failed to exhaust domestic remedies in relation to the
claim, and so the Committee found it inadmissible. 293 Neither
reputation nor honor featured in the Communication.294
In Alekperov v. Russia, the author Zeydulla Vagab Ogly
Alekperov was a prison inmate appealing multiple administrative
details of his sentencing.295 His Article 17 claim was over an alleged
interference with his ability to file a Communication, regarding the
very case at hand, with the Committee.296 The Committee found that
the author had not substantiated the claim, and found it
inadmissible.297 Again, reputation did not factor into the Article 17
claim.298
In Y.B. v. Russia, the author was the defendant in a criminal
case that lasted approximately two years.299 More than a year after the
292. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 2126/2011, supra note 289, ¶ 3.3 (“The
author further submits that, if he were returned to Afghanistan, his family life would be
destroyed and annihilated, since his daughter and spouse would not be able to go with him, as
the situation of general violence there amounts to a violation of article 7 of the Covenant.
Moreover, they would be specifically targeted as non-Muslim women who do not speak the
language and do not know the local customs, including religious customs. The author therefore
submits that if he were deported to Afghanistan his rights under article 17 of the Covenant
would be violated.”).
293. Id. ¶ 10.4 (“The Committee notes the State party’s submission that the author had
failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies in that he had failed to request a residence
permit on the basis of his marriage to a Russian Federation citizen. The Committee notes that
the author has not provided an explanation as to why applying for a residence permit on the
ground of being married to a Russian Federation citizen and having a child, who is also a
Russian Federation citizen, would not have constituted an effective remedy for the protection
of his rights under article 17 of the Covenant. The Committee therefore declares the author’s
claim under article 17 to be inadmissible under article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional
Protocol.”).
294. See generally id.
295. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1764/2008, supra note 289.
296. Id. ¶ 2.11 (“The author’s sister requested the Committee: (1) not to discontinue his
communication; (2) to inform the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation in Geneva
about the interference with his correspondence with the Committee, and (3) to request the
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to provide explanations.”).
297 . Id. ¶ 8.5 (“the Committee considers that this part of the communication is
insufficiently substantiated for purposes of admissibility, and declares it inadmissible under
article 2 of the Optional Protocol.”).
298. See generally id.
299. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1983/2010, supra note 289, ¶¶ 2.1-2.2 (“2.1
On 26 June 2006, the Prosecutor’s office in Velikie Luki, the town where the author resided,
initiated criminal proceedings against him under article 319 of the Criminal Code (publicly
offending a State agent). 2.2 On 27 May 2008, the justice of the peace of the 33rd district of
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case was closed without going to trial, the local court’s website posted
a press release stating that there was an ongoing criminal
investigation against the author.300 Y.B. sued the town court, claiming
damage to his reputation.301 The court stated a lack of jurisdiction,
and the appellate level upheld that decision.302 In a related Article 17
claim in the same Communication, Y.B.’s medical information was
made known to a number of people involved with his investigation.303
In all Y.B. claimed that Russia had violated seven different Articles
of the ICCPR in handling his case, but the Committee found each
claim to be unsubstantiated and, therefore, inadmissible.304
b. Successful Honor and Reputation Claims against other States
Parties
The Committee has, in six cases, considered and ruled favorably
on the merits regarding unlawful or arbitrary attacks on honor or
Velikie Luki issued a decision to terminate the court case against the author based on the
absence of corpus delicti of the crime.”).
300. Id. ¶ 2.4 (“On 1 July 2009, an article was published on the website of the town court
of Velikie Luki in the public information section, which included information to the effect that
there was an ongoing criminal case against the author and that he was being investigated. The
author was mentioned by name and information damaging to his reputation was accessible to
all.”).
301. Id. ¶ 2.5 (“[T]he author filed an application with the town court of Velikie Luki
seeking compensation for the moral damages inflicted to him by the public being wrongly
informed that he was under investigation for criminal activity.”).
302. Id. ¶ 2.6 (“On 23 October 2009, the town court of Velikie Luki issued a ruling
returning the author’s claim for lack of jurisdiction. The author then appealed this ruling to the
Pskov regional court, which, on 1 December 2009, issued a cassation decision confirming that
the Velikie Luki town court had no jurisdiction and ruling that the claim should be filed with
the Moscow city court. The author attempted to apply for a supervisory review of that
decision, but his request was denied by the Pskov regional court on 18 January 2010.”).
303. Id. ¶ 6.4 (“The author further submitted that during the pretrial investigation in
2006 a number of his medical records had been taken from medical establishments by
investigating officers without a court order, in violation of his right to privacy under article 17,
paragraph 1, of the Covenant. In that manner, confidential information regarding the state of
the author’s health had become known to a large number of persons.”).
304. Id. ¶ 9.5 (“The Committee observes that the author’s allegations of violations of his
rights under [articles including 17] … are not substantiated in relation to the subject matter of
his initial communication, namely that the refusal of the Velikie Luki town court to hear his
case for moral damages caused by the publication of erroneous information on the court’s
website, constituted a denial of justice. Therefore, the allegations in the above submissions are
inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. The finding above is without prejudice to
the author’s ability to submit a separate communication with regard to any alleged violations
of his rights under the Covenant that may have occurred.”).
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reputation.305 Three of the Communications that resulted in favorable
judgments for the claimants — that is, where the Committee found
State violations of Article 17 of the ICCPR — are considered here.
This subsection begins by examining a Communication with some
similarities to the case of Mr. Nemtsov. In that case, the government
of Turkmenistan asserted falsely on national television and in print
that the author, an opposition-affiliated journalist with connections to
the United States, had been involved in an assassination plot against
the President of Turkmenistan; the Committee found that
Turkmenistan had violated Article 17.306
The subsection then continues with two additional Committee
Views treating cases that very clearly featured unlawful or arbitrary
interference with an individual’s honor or reputation. In one, the
Philippines was found to have violated Article 17 after officially
declaring that the murder of a potential whistleblower was a
suicide.307 In the other, Germany was found to have violated Article
17 after one of its courts arbitrarily ordered a pro se litigant in a
complex inheritance dispute to undergo psychiatric testing.308
There are three important distinguishing factors to note when
considering these latter two cases alongside the case of Mr. Nemtsov.
The first is that neither claim concerns the use of national media to
defame the individual claimant.309 The second factor is that in no case
is the claimant alleged to have engaged in a conspiracy, or in conduct
generally, of such enormity as to threaten the nation, as in the case of
Mr. Nemtsov.310 The third point is that the State acts that implicated
305. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1958/2010 (A.M.H. El Hojouj Jum’a et al.
v. Libya), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/111/D/1958/2010 (July 21, 2014); Hum. Rts. Comm.
Communication No. 1922/2009 (Martinez, et al. v. Algeria), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/109/D/1922/2009 (Oct. 28, 2013); Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007
(Pestaño v. The Philippines), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/1619/2007 (Mar. 23, 2010); Hum. Rts.
Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006 (Komarovski v. Turkmenistan), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/93/D/1450/2006 (July 24, 2008); Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006
(M.G. v. Germany), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1482/2006 (July 23, 2008); and Hum. Rts.
Comm. Communication No. 852/1999 (Borisenko v. Hungary), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/76/D/852/1999 (Oct. 14, 2002).
306. See Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006, supra note 305.
307. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305.
308. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305.
309. See generally Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305;
Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305.
310. See generally Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305;
Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305.
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the following individuals’ honor or reputation did so indirectly by
way of social stigma attached to a claim or representation about the
target, not directly with allegations concerning the individual’s
credibility.311 All the same, the Committee found that States Parties
arbitrarily or unlawfully interfered with the privacy, honor, and
reputation of these claimants. The intention of this part of the
subsection is to show, with all due respect to the authors of the
Communications under discussion, that the Committee has found
violations of Article 17 where interferences with an individual’s
honor and reputation are of significantly lower gravity than the
Russian media’s attacks on the honor and reputation of Mr.
Nemtsov.312
The case of Komarovski v. Turkmenistan is similar to Mr.
Nemtsov’s case in that State media made explicit defamatory
allegations against the claimant.313 Leonid Komarovski, its author, is
an ethnically Russian United States citizen.314 While in the Turkmen
capital Ashgabat on business, Mr. Komarovski was arrested on
charges that he was connected to an assassination attempt on
President for Life of Turkmenistan, Saparmurad Niyazov
(“Türkmenbaşy”).315
Türkmenbaşy’s motorcade was alleged to have been fired upon
two days after Mr. Komarovski’s arrival in Ashgabat. 316 After the
apparent assassination attempt, Türkmenbaşy announced on national
311. Even though in Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305,
the point of the psychiatric exam seems to have been to undermine the individual’s credibility.
See Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305, ¶ 2.6 (“[T]he
Ellwangen Regional Court ... had ordered her medical examination without objective reasons
and without a prior oral hearing.”).
312. See generally Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305;
Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006 supra note 305.
313. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006, supra note 305, ¶ 3.8 (“The
author further claims to be a victim of a violation of article 17, paragraph 1 of the Covenant in
that, at the end of 2003, the State party’s government published a book, allegedly written by
him, containing the official version of the events of 25 November 2002. On several occasions
the author has publicly stated that he did not write the book, is unfamiliar with its contents and
does not have copyright in it, despite the copyright symbol appearing next to his name. He
never signed any contract with the State party’s authorities allowing them to use his name on
any publication or to publish or sell anything under his name. The existence of this book
constitutes an unlawful attack on his honour and reputation.”).
314. Id. ¶ 1.1
315. Id. ¶ 2.5-2.6 (describing the general details of Mr. Komarovski's detention).
316. Id. ¶ 2.4 (describing the purported assassination attempt on Türkmenbaşy).
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television that leaders of the Turkmen Popular Democratic Movement
(“NDDT”), an opposition party, were responsible.317 Mr. Komarovski
was arrested shortly thereafter while in the home of an associate who
had some connection to the NDDT leadership that is not made clear in
the Committee View. 318 Mr. Komarovski was held incommunicado
for one week before United States officials were notified of his
arrest.319 Turkmen law enforcement held him for roughly another five
months thereafter, beating and drugging him in detention. 320 After
being injected against his consent with an unknown narcotic, Mr.
Komarovski was filmed admitting to participation in an attempted
coup d’état against the Türkmenbaşy government; the video was
broadcast on national television.321 He asserted no recollection of the
confession. 322 Mr. Komarovski was eventually released following
“the intervention of the United States Embassy.”323 In addition to the
national broadcast of Mr. Komarovski’s “confession,” Turkmen
authorities published a book that they alleged to have been authored
by Mr. Komarovski, detailing his participation in the attempt on the
life of Türkmenbaşy.324 Mr. Komarovski asserted no involvement in
the writing or publication of the book.325
In addition to several claims related to his arbitrary detention,
Mr. Komarovski asserted that Turkmenistan had unlawfully interfered
with his reputation under Article 17 by way of the publication of the

317. Id. ¶ 2.4 (noting the accusations against Mr. Komarovski on national television).
318. Id. ¶ 2.5
319. Id. ¶ 2.8 (“During the entire detention period, the author was not allowed to contact
his family in writing or over the phone, or receive their visit. He was held incommunicado for
the first seven days of detention, before the US embassy [sic] in Ashgabat was notified of his
detention.”).
320. Id. ¶¶ 2.8-2.11 (noting author’s detention from December 2002 to April 2003).
321. Id. ¶ 2.9 (“[A]fter his release, he was shown a video of himself admitting to be a
drug addict and to have participated in the plot against the President. He does not remember
having made this statement, which was broadcast on 18 December 2002 on Turkmen Public
Television.”).
322. Id.
323. Id. ¶ 2.11 (“On 15 April 2003, following the intervention of the United States
Embassy, the author was released by Presidential Pardon. At the end of 2003, the Turkmen
authorities published a book, allegedly written by the author, in which he admits his
participation in the attempted assassination of the President. The author denies having written
this book.”).
324. Id.
325. Id.
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book.326 In the most succinct paragraph of the Views, the Committee
holds that the false portrayal of Mr. Komarovski in a book confirming
the “official version” of the assassination attempt constituted an
unlawful interference with his honor and reputation, in violation of
Article 17 of the ICCPR.327 Regardless of the additional claims, the
Committee found a violation of Article 17 based on that single State
act of defamation against the claimant.328
In Pestaño v. The Philippines, the authors’ son was one of
several sailors in the Philippine Navy who died under mysterious
circumstances in 1995 after refusing to participate in a massive drugsmuggling operation.329 The Philippine Navy stated officially that the
authors’ son had committed suicide, but buried him in the national
military cemetery with full honors despite a Navy policy barring such
treatment for suicides.330 The authors’ son’s life insurance paid out his
coverage in full, apparently not believing that the cause of death was
suicide.331
Following the disappearances of two associates of the authors’
son, members of the Philippine Senate ordered an inquiry into the
case. 332 Subsequently, a vice-admiral of the Philippine Navy
intervened in the case on two occasions.333 First, he requested that the
326. Id. ¶ 3.8 (“The author further claims to be a victim of a violation of article 17,
paragraph 1 of the Covenant in that, at the end of 2003, the State party’s government published
a book, allegedly written by him, containing the official version of the events of 25 November
2002.”).
327. Id. ¶ 7.7 (“Finally, the publication of a book confirming the official version of the
events of 25 November 2002 which falsely portrays the author as the writer of the book,
constitutes, in the absence of relevant information from the State party, an unlawful
interference with the author’s privacy and an unlawful attack against his honour and
reputation, in violation of article 17, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.”).
328. Id.
329. See Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305, ¶¶ 2.2-2.5
(relaying the chronology of the authors’ son’s death and burial).
330. Id. ¶ 2.5 (“On 30 September 1995, the authors’ son was buried in the National
Cemetery for military personnel and given full military honours, despite a Navy policy stating
that suicide victims should not benefit from such treatment.”).
331. Id. ¶ 2.7 (“In the course of the same month, after conducting its own inquiry, and
despite the official Navy and police conclusions, the victim’s insurance company paid the full
amount of his coverage to his beneficiaries for his death.”).
332 . Id. ¶ 2.10 (“On 15 November 1995, two Senators filed a Senate Resolution,
directing the appropriate Senate Committees to conduct an inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the death of the authors’ son.”).
333. Id. ¶ 2.11 (“In December 1995, the State party’s Navy Flag Officer in Command, a
Vice-Admiral, invited the authors to dinner, and requested that they refrain from pursuing their
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authors “refrain from pursuing” their son’s case. 334 On the second
occasion, the official threatened to cancel a contract between the
authors and the Philippine Navy worth PHP100,000,000 if they
pursued the case.335 After refusing to abandon the case, all four of the
Philippine Navy ships being repaired by the authors’ company
mysteriously sank, the company’s offices were ransacked, and the
authors’ nephew, an employee of the company, was killed.336
Three years later, the Senate investigation concluded that the
Pestaños’ son was killed other than by suicide.337 However, it was not
until seven years later still, in 2005, that the case was reopened, only
to see the lead investigator replaced and the case left
uninvestigated. 338 At the Committee, the Pestaños asserted that the
elaborate cover-up of their son’s death, including the allegations that
he had committed suicide, was an unlawful attack on his honor and
reputation under Article 17. 339 The Committee found that on the

son’s case against the Navy. Two weeks later, the Navy Flag Officer in Command sought to
see the authors again, and presented the author, Mr. Pestaño, with his company’s contract with
the Navy, worth a hundred-million pesos, together with an affidavit of waiver and desistance
to pursue his suit against the Navy.”).
334. Id.
335. Id. At that time, PHP100 million was worth US$3,888,870. Bankers Association of
the Philippines, Exchange Rates > Philippine Peso per US Dollar 1995,
http://www.bsp.gov.ph/dbank_reports/ExchangeRates_1_rpt.asp?frequency=Annual&range_
from=1995&range_to=1995&conversion=Average.
336 . Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305, ¶ 2.11
(describing the mysterious events following the Pestaños' refusal to abandon the investigation
of their son's death).
337 . Id. ¶ 2.15 (“On 25 January 1998, after eight Committee hearings, a visual
inspection of the stateroom of the authors’ son in the ship, and relying, inter alia, on expert
evidence5 and witness testimonies, two Senate Committees issued a Joint report on the
Pestaño case, which contained the following findings: (i) The authors’ son did not kill himself
on the BRP Bacolod City on 27 September 1995; (ii) he was shot in one place in the vessel
different from the one where his body was found; (iii) after his death, his body was moved and
laid on the bed where it was found; (iv) he must have been shot on board the BRP Bacolod
City before the vessel reached the Navy Headquarters on 27 September 1995; (v) there was a
deliberate attempt to make it appear that the authors’ son killed himself inside his stateroom;
and (vi) such an attempt was so deliberate and elaborate that one person could not have
accomplished it by himself.”).
338. Id. ¶ 2.17 (“[T]he case was left uninvestigated in the Office of the Ombudsman for
military affairs.”).
339. Id. ¶ 3.2 (“[The authors] recall the Senate Committee’s findings of 1998, which
they believe conclusively established that their son did not commit suicide, but was murdered.
They add that there was a deliberate and elaborate conspiracy to cover-up his death, including
through fabrication destruction or tampering of evidence, as well as misrepresentation and
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merits, the Philippines’ attempt to make it appear that the authors’ son
had committed suicide, when in fact he had clearly been murdered,
was an unlawful attack on his honor.340
In M.G. v. Germany, the author, Ms. M.G., had been ordered to
undergo a psychological examination to determine whether she was
fit to litigate on her own behalf in an inheritance dispute. 341 She
demonstrated that existing physical ailments had been exacerbated by
the stress of handling what appeared to be a complex and contentious
case pro se. 342 Ms. M.G. filed a complaint against the court that
ordered the exam; it was rejected without explanation.343 Ms. M.G.
submitted to the Committee that the decision to subject her to a
medical examination without objective reasons and without a hearing
was an unlawful interference with her privacy under Article 17.344
The Committee went further in its Views, holding that the social
stigma and potential reputational consequences of psychological
illness made the interference with Ms. M.G.’s privacy
disproportionate to the end sought, and therefore an arbitrary
interference with her honor and reputation under Article 17.345
The Committee tends to use soft language when determining
recourse for individuals in whose favor it has ruled. For example, in
Komarovski v. Turkmenistan, the Committee ordered Turkmenistan
to provide Mr. Komarovski with an “effective remedy,” as well as to
prosecute individuals behind the violations of his rights, pay him
“reparations,” and also make a public retraction of the claims related
to the book.346 The Committee will generally not order the payment of
money damages, in contrast to the European Court — which is
discussed in the following section.

distortion of facts, all of which constituted an obstruction of justice, and an unlawful attack
against the authors’ son honour.”).
340. Id. ¶ 6.6 (“The Committee notes that the authors’ claim under article 17 paragraph
1, to the effect that the State party’s attempt to make it appear that the victim committed
suicide, is to be construed as an unlawful attack against his honour.”).
341. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305, ¶¶ 2.1-2.2.
342. Id. ¶ 2.5 (giving background on Ms. M.G.'s case).
343. Id. ¶ 2.4.
344. Id. ¶ 2.5.
345. Id. ¶¶ 10.1-10.2.
346. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006, supra note 305, ¶ 9.
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3. Interference with Private Life at the European Court
This Section considers four successful reputation-related claims
at the European Court. In comparison with the scarcity of Article 17
Committee Views, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled on
over one thousand Article 8 (privacy) claims against States Parties to
the Convention. 347 Russia is the fourth-most-sued State on privacy
claims at the European Court. 348 A search of “reputation” within
European Court judgments that includes Article 8 violations returns
104 results. 349 To find an invasion of privacy, the European Court
looks to whether the invasion was both lawful and “necessary in a
democratic society.”350 However, as these cases show, the European
Court does not directly address reputation — it includes damage to
reputation as a possible corollary of improper invasions of privacy.351
For that reason, none of the following cases can be read on point with
the case of Mr. Nemtsov in the way of, for example, Komarovski v.
Turkmenistan at the Committee.
The pair of cases Kolesnichenko v. Russia and Yuditskaya and
Others v. Russia saw privacy complaints follow law enforcement
mistreatment of lawyers in Perm, a small city 1,400 kilometers (870
miles) east of Moscow.352 In Kolesnichenko v. Russia, the applicant,
Aleksey Kolesnichenko, was accused of forging documents for a
criminal defendant he was representing, resulting in the issuance of
warrants to search his apartment and that of his parents. 353 In
Yuditskaya and Others v. Russia, the applicant’s law firm was raided
when one of its lawyers, on a frolic of his own, was caught forging a
contract in order to cover up a bribery scheme to which he was
otherwise not party.354
347. Decisions Concerning Article 8, supra note 255.
348 . Id. (showing 135 reported cases against Italy, 101 against Poland, 96 against
Turkey, and 88 against Russia).
349. Id. (in “VIOLATION,” select “8;” enter keyword “reputation”).
350. ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 8 (“There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of” the right to privacy and family life “except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”)
351. Id.
352. See generally Yuditskaya and Others v. Russia, App. No. 5678/06 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2015); see also Kolesnichenko v. Russia, App. No. 19856/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009).
353. Kolesnichenko, supra note 352, ¶¶ 8-10.
354. Yuditskaya, supra note 352, ¶¶ 8-10.
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The European Court did not directly consider reputation in either
case, and neither applicant submitted that interference with or damage
to reputation was the basis of the alleged Article 8 violation.355 Mr.
Kolesnichenko’s claim was exclusively related to the inviolability of
the home, while Yuditskaya et al similarly alleged an Article 8
violation due to unreasonable search and seizure.356 As in the other
European Court cases examined below, the Court brought up the
question of reputation sua sponte, and, anyway, in passing.357 In both
cases, the Court found that investigators had acted with unrestricted,
and therefore unreasonable, discretion in the searches in question.358
Among other reasons, while at least considering damage to reputation
as a corollary, the Court found the searches to be unreasonable and
therefore to have been violative of Article 8.359
One case considers the reputational consequences of direct State
action. In Sõro v. Estonia, applicant Mihhail Sõro was an Estonian
national who had been employed by the Soviet security and
intelligence services (“KGB”) as a driver during the period of Soviet
occupation of the Baltic States including Estonia.360 In 2004, thirteen
years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and ten years after the
withdrawal of Russian military personnel from Estonia, Mr. Sõro’s
employment with the KGB during the years 1980-91 was made public
pursuant to an Estonian statute.361
While Estonia asserted the necessity of rooting out agents of the
country’s former occupiers, Mr. Sõro responded that he was only a
driver, was not involved in any intelligence-gathering activities, and
was forced out of his job as a result of Estonia’s official publication
of his status as a KGB employee – despite the fact that he had always
disclosed it when applying for work.362 In 2007, the Tallinn Court of
Appeals, the Estonian appellate court deciding against Mr. Sõro, held
that, essentially, he was to be assumed guilty of collaboration with an
occupier because establishing his innocence would be too difficult

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Yuditskaya, supra note 352; Kolesnichenko, supra note 352.
Yuditskaya, supra note 352, ¶ 3; Kolesnichenko, supra note 352, ¶ 3.
Yuditskaya, supra note 352, ¶ 28; Kolesnichenko, supra note 352, ¶ 31.
Yuditskaya, supra note 352, ¶ 29; Kolesnichenko, supra note 352, ¶ 33.
Yuditskaya, supra note 352, ¶ 2; Kolesnichenko, supra note 352, at Judgment, ¶ 2.
Sõro v. Estonia, App. No. 22588/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015) ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 30.
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given the passage of time since his employment with the KGB.363 The
Tallinn Court stated in this same ruling, though, that official
publication of Mr. Sõro’s status as former a KGB employee was
inherently defamatory. 364 The European Court, reading the Tallinn
Court’s judgment, found the Estonian statute requiring public
disclosure of KGB affiliation to have a “punitive character on top of
its alleged preventive purpose.”365
Mr. Sõro asserted that while he had never faced problems with
employment despite disclosing his past as a KGB driver, he was
treated as “an occupier, a traitor, a snitch among his colleagues and
acquaintances” following Estonia’s official publication of that
status.366 In ruling on the merits, the European Court found that the
public disclosure included facts about Mr. Sõro’s past that had the
capacity to negatively impact his reputation.367 The Court also found
that the interference was lawful in theory, but was applied
arbitrarily.368 In that connection, it found a violation of Article 8.369
In Khmel v. Russia, the applicant was a regional legislator who
threw a protracted temper tantrum in a police station following his
midday arrest on drunk driving charges. 370 After being released
following his refusal to take a sobriety test, and once his status as
regional Duma deputy had been established, Aleksandr Khmel not
only verbally abused police officers at the precinct, but also threw his
shoes at them and proceeded to unload desk drawers onto the floor.371
Despite his release, Mr. Khmel refused to leave the station, “wreaking
havoc,” in the words of the Court. 372 As this was happening, the
police chief informed local television media of the incident, and
cameramen came to the station to catch it on film.373 It was shown the
following day during a news broadcast to viewers in Murmansk, Mr.
Khmel’s constituent region.374 In his complaint, Mr. Khmel asserted
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id. ¶ 32.
Id. at n.38.
Id.
Id. ¶ 53.
See id. ¶ 56.
See id. ¶ 57, 61.
See id. ¶ 63-64.
See Khmel v. Russia, App. No. 20383/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), ¶ 5.
See id. ¶¶ 6-8.
Id. ¶¶ 46.
See id. ¶¶ 8-9.
See id. ¶¶ 6, 11.
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that in addition to being filmed against his consent, the sole purpose
of the broadcast was to tarnish his reputation.375
The European Court addressed various aspects of the incident,
but in connection to the Article 8 section of the complaint, focused on
the filming and broadcast of Mr. Khmel without his consent.376 First
and foremost, the Court noted that the concept of private life extends
to “aspects relating to personal identity, such as a person’s name or
image.” 377 In its discussion of the interference with Mr. Khmel’s
privacy, the European Court held that such interference must be “in
accordance with the law,” that being the domestic law of the State
Party defendant, and also be “necessary in a democratic society.”378
The Court found that since the first requirement was not met, it was
unnecessary to explore the second. 379 One law the European Court
examined, and with which the interference would need to be in
accordance, was Article 38 of the Russian Law on Mass Media,
discussed previously in this Note.380
Despite Mr. Khmel’s “disorderly and violent” behavior in
custody, the European Court still found that the filming and broadcast
of the video against his consent, and which had the potential to
damage his reputation, violated Article 8.381 That is, even where the
media’s dissemination of damaging information about a public
official was true, the Court found a violation of Article 8 where the
dissemination was unlawful.382 In this way, at least, Khmel v. Russia
should be persuasive to the Court should it be faced with a defamation
claim by representatives of Mr. Nemtsov.
In three of the Article 8 cases discussed here, the European
Court awarded claimants four-figure euro sums including pecuniary
and non-pecuniary damages as well as costs. 383 In Yuditskaya v.
Russia, the applicants did not submit a claim for just satisfaction, and
375. See id. ¶ 39.
376. See id. ¶ 36.
377. Id. ¶ 40.
378. Id. ¶ 45.
379. See id. ¶ 51.
380. See id. ¶ 16. See also supra Section II(2)(d) (discussing Article 38 of the Russian
Law on Mass Media).
381. See Khmel, supra note 370, ¶¶ 46, 52.
382. See id. ¶ 49.
383. See id. at Judgment, ¶ 4; Sõro, supra note 360, at Judgment, ¶ 3; Kolesnichenko,
supra note 352, at Judgment, ¶ 3.
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so the Court awarded them nothing while declaring a violation of
Article 8 of the ECHR.384 In no case did the European Court call on
the State Party defendant to take action other than to pay out the
damages.385
This Part has explored international human rights litigation on
reputation and reputation-related questions. At the Committee, this
includes Komarovski v. Russia, which featured a cause of action on
point with the case of Mr. Nemtsov — that is, where national media
was used in a character assassination campaign. 386 It also included
cases where the effects of State acts had reputational implications on
the claimants that were arguably of far lesser gravity than those of the
claims made by Russian media that Mr. Nemtsov was at the head of a
campaign to destabilize his country. 387 In all of these cases, the
Committee found violations of Article 17 — a good sign for Mr.
Nemtsov’s case. 388 Further, in all of these cases, the Committee
ordered the State Party defendant to report on its remedial actions
going forward.389
At the European Court, however, cases on point with that of Mr.
Nemtsov were harder to find. The cases under examination in this
Part focused on State actions that, as the European Court found it, had
knock-on effects that included detriment to reputation. While
mentioning these effects in passing, the rulings that a State Party had
violated Article 8 of the ECHR tended to rest on privacy violations of
a different color. And when finding violations, the European Court
ordered small damages amounts — even in comparison with the

384. See Yuditskaya, supra note 352, at ¶ 34.
385. See id. at Judgment, ¶¶ 1-2; Khmel, supra note 370, at Judgment, ¶¶ 1-5; Sõro,
supra note 360, at Judgment ¶¶ 1-4; Kolesnichenko, supra note 352, at Judgment ¶¶ 1-4.
386. See Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006, supra note 305. See also
supra notes 313-28 and accompanying text.
387. See generally Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305;
Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305. See also supra notes 32945 and accompanying text.
388. See generally Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006, supra note 305;
M.G., supra note 305; Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305.
389. See generally Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006, supra note 305;
Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305; Hum. Rts. Comm.
Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305.
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damages available for defamation under Russian law — while
seeking no further action from the State Party.390
IV: THE DEFAMATION CASE FOR BORIS NEMTSOV
Media hostility towards Boris E. Nemtsov, in the form of a
character assassination campaign, grew in proportion to his criticism
of President Vladimir V. Putin during the two years leading up to his
murder on February 27, 2015.391 Mr. Nemtsov was alleged to be a
leader of the so-called “fifth column,” a conspiracy of political
agitators on the take from non-Russian powers.392 Essentially, these
media very clearly accused Mr. Nemtsov of treason while providing
no substantiation for the claims. 393 On one occasion, Mr. Putin
accused Mr. Nemtsov of large-scale theft of public funds.394 Further,
the Russian government apparently took no action to force the media
engaged in attacks on Mr. Nemtsov’s credibility to prove the
allegations asserted against him or to cease making them.
Russian statutory law provides robust protections to reputation,
dignity, and honor in its Constitution, Civil Code, and Criminal
Code.395 In addition to statutory law, the Russian Supreme Court has
issued a Plenary Directive on courts’ application of the criminal and
civil statutes concerning attacks to reputation. 396 Two important
features of this Directive are a stated bar on statutes of limitations on
such claims, and, relatedly, express permission of posthumous
claims.397

390. See, e.g., Khmel, supra note 370, at Judgment, ¶ 4. See also supra notes 347-85 and
accompanying text.
391. See Nechepurenko, supra note 5 (describing the toxic media atmosphere in Russia
regarding opposition politics); Lipman, supra note 5 (describing same).
392. See Lipman, supra note 5.
393. See id.
394. See Путин призвал не допустить во власть тех, кто “поураганил” в 90-е
годы, supra note 26 (quoting Mr. Putin's allegation that Mr. Nemtsov “churned” the Russian
people during his tenure as a public servant).
395. See supra Part II.
396 . See Plenary Directive, supra note 3 (directing Russian courts on interpretive
questions related to criminal and civil defamation matters).
397. See id.
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Mr. Nemtsov unsuccessfully sued Mr. Putin personally on a
defamation claim while he was still alive. 398 However, given the
provisions of Russian law outlining media liability for attacks on
personal dignity and honor, Mr. Nemtsov’s representatives have a
good case against media outlets that participated in the character
assassination campaign under discussion here.399 It is not outside the
realm of possibility that the Russian courts could provide Mr.
Nemtsov’s representatives with satisfactory recourse. Such recourse
could potentially include not only money damages, but also
refutations of unsubstantiated claims against Mr. Nemtsov in the
media used to make those allegations in the first place, at cost to the
defendant.400
Should Mr. Nemtsov’s representatives exhaust the Russian court
system without a ruling in his favor, they have potential recourse at
two international tribunals: the European Court of Human Rights, and
the United Nations Human Rights Committee. 401 The Russian
Supreme Court expressly includes consideration of European Court
norms in its application of defamation law, and the Russian
Federation has reported to the Committee on its incorporation of
ICCPR understandings of respect for personal dignity, among other
things, into its federal laws.402 But the tribunals are not created equal
when it comes to defamation claims.
There are two important considerations regarding differences
between the potential and probable outcomes at each tribunal. The
first is that the Committee more expressly recognizes reputation as a
separately delineated individual right, given its inclusion in the
language of Article 17 of the ICCPR.403 The Committee has found in
favor of claimants asserting victimhood of character assassination
campaigns in the media of States in Russia’s geopolitical
neighborhood.404 Meanwhile, cases at the European Court concerning
398. See Немцов, Рыжков и Милов подали иск против Путина за клевету (Nemtsov,
Ryzhkov, and Milov File Defamation Suit against Putin), FONTANKA (Dec. 23, 2010),
http://www.fontanka.ru/2010/12/23/119/.
399. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
400. See id.
401. See ICCPR Status, supra note 200; First Optional Protocol Status, supra note 207;
ECHR Status, supra note 239.
402. See Russian Periodic Report, supra note 157.
403. See ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17.
404. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006, supra note 305.
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reputation as such are few, as damage to reputation is usually seen in
that court as an offshoot of violations of privacy; Article 8 of the
ECHR does not name reputation as a protected right.405 The second
consideration is that while the European Court awards money
damages, the amounts are small and the Committee tends to order
States to follow up and provide other recourse to applicants asserting
violations of the ICCPR.406 In the case of Mr. Nemtsov, this could
include enforcement of Russia’s very strong anti-defamation statutes
to Mr. Nemtsov’s benefit.
If past Article 8 (privacy) actions including damage to reputation
at the European Court are a guide, the Court is likely to award Mr.
Nemtsov’s representatives money damages. 407 Though the example
cases explored in this Note do not consider reputation as the
foundational right of the claim, Mr. Nemtsov’s case is so obvious that
the Court would be very likely to read a violation of privacy into the
reputational effects of the Russian media campaign on Mr. Nemtsov’s
private life. One way, for example, would be to cite the multiple
observer claims that the very media atmosphere in question was a
proximate cause of Mr. Nemtsov’s assassination. 408 Where State
ownership of complicit media could be established, the European
Court would need to find that the interference with Mr. Nemtsov’s
privacy was unlawful — which, as shown supra, it would be under
Russian law — and unnecessary in a democratic society. Establishing
neither of these would be difficult.
Meanwhile, at the Committee, Mr. Nemtsov’s representatives
would not need to show State action directing the media campaign in
question, or even State ownership of the media. 409 This is because
Article 17 of the ICCPR creates an obligation on States Parties to
protect their nationals against interference with their reputation. 410
The Committee would be likely to order the Russian Federation to

405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

See ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 8.
Compare supra Part III.2 with supra Part III.3.
See supra notes 383-85 and accompanying text.
See Nechepurenko, supra note 5; Lipman, supra note 5.
See ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17.
See id.
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“remedy” the situation concerning Mr. Nemtsov’s reputation; Russian
federal law features various reasonable methods of doing so.411
CONCLUSION
Without taking any position on unsubstantiated allegations of
Kremlin involvement in the February 2015 assassination of Russian
opposition elder statesman Boris E. Nemtsov, it is the project of this
Note to demonstrate the strength of a defamation case on Mr.
Nemtsov’s behalf in Russian and international courts. The case is
strong, in fact, regardless of his murder, and is based on the character
assassination campaign directed against Mr. Nemtsov in response to
his exposure of malversation and sharp criticism of Russian foreign
policy. 412 The federal laws of the Russian Federation provide
extensive civil and criminal remedies for defamation, with expanded
liability when the media is used to slanderous ends. If the Russian
courts do not rule in Mr. Nemtsov’s favor, the case may and should
continue internationally given Russia’s ratification of two
international treaties creating human rights tribunals.
Given the differences in damage procedures, though, the United
Nations Human Rights Committee is the preferable tribunal.
However, Mr. Nemtsov’s representatives would have a very strong
case regardless of which international court they choose to litigate
with a view to restoring his honor. Given the protections to dignity
and honor in Russian law, and the domestic exhaustion requirements
in the international courts, they should start their suit in Russia. Also,
given the Russian Supreme Court’s bar on statutes of limitations and
permission of posthumous defamation claims, they would be able to
take as much time as possible to gather information beyond the scope
of this Note to make their case in the domestic court system. No
matter what, the right to reputation is protected by law both in Russia
and internationally, and, therefore, the case for Boris Nemtsov is
clear.

411. See Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006, supra note 305; Hum. Rts.
Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305; Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication
No. 1619/2007, supra note 305. See also supra Part II.
412. See Nechepurenko, supra note 5; Lipman, supra note 5.
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